History matters. A comparative analysis of historical legacies and post-communist corruption by Dalsbø, Thomas
  
 
HISTORY MATTERS 
A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF HISTORICAL LEGACIES AND POST-
COMMUNIST CORRUPTION  
THOMAS DALSBØ 
 
Master’s Thesis  
Department of Comparative Politics  
UNIVERSITY OF BERGEN 
Spring 2014 
 
 
 
i 
 
Abstract 
This thesis investigates the empirical relationship between historical legacies and post-communist 
corruption. A common argument in the post-communist corruption literature is that the current 
problems of corruption should be traced to either the communist past or to the transition from the 
socialist economy. However, this thesis join the ranks of Møller and Skaaning (2010) who claims 
that deep structural causes are of the essence: causes that transcends both the transition from the 
socialist economy and the communist experience. In particular, the hypothesis that pre-
communist bureaucratic legacies can explain much of the current variation in levels of post-
communist corruption, receives support. In contrast to Møller and Skaaning (2010) I use time-
series cross-section (TSCS) data (they apply cross-sectional data) and test the hypothesis against 
a larger battery of alternative explanations. The main conclusion of this study is that levels of 
post-communist corruption largely can be explained by historical legacies. Furthermore, this 
study finds evidence for the impact of imperial legacies (which is a closely related variable to 
bureaucratic legacies) and it finds partial support for the effect of a protestant heritage. In 
addition, it shows that post-communist countries on average are more corrupt than other 
countries, but argue that this difference also reflect pre-communist causes that got reproduced 
during communism.  
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“One must always maintain one’s connection with the past 
and yet ceaselessly pull away from it” 
- Gaston Bachelard 
1. Introduction 
Are historical legacies more important than proximate causes when explaining post-communist 
corruption? The answer may not be obvious. On the one hand, it is reasonable to believe that 
institutional, cultural, political and economic legacies of the past have profoundly shaped the 
post-communist countries – and by that also their relative levels of corruption. On the other hand, 
causes located closer in time and especially those causes dating back to the transition (such as 
initial power balance, EU-integration incentives, economic reform, etc.), can obviously also be 
thought to influence current levels of corruption. A common approach to this puzzle has been to 
trace the causes of post-communist corruption back to two factors: the communist past and/or the 
transition from the socialist economy (Sandholtz and Taagepera 2005, Holmes 2006). The current 
thesis, however, argue that the causes for post-communist corruption must be traced further back: 
to historical causes that transcends both the transition and the communist past.    
The post-communist world is marked by an interesting characteristic: diversity. After the fall of 
communism, a myriad of states emerged from what many thought was a more or less 
homogenous region. It quickly became clear that the countries once thought of as the “second 
world” differed substantially both economically, societally and politically. In the 1990’s political 
scientist largely attributed these differences to proximate factors such as elite politics (Linz and 
Valenzuela 1994, Huntington 1993, Di Palma 1990), initial post-communist power balance 
(McFaul 2002, Fish 1998, 1997, Roeder 1994)  institutional choices (Ishiyama and Velten 1998) 
and third wave democratization (Diamond and Plattner 1996) emphasizing geographical diffusion 
(Kopstein and Reilly 2000) and incentives for European integration  (Kurtz and Barnes 2002, 
Pridham and Ágh 2001).  
However, scholars of post-communism have increasingly highlighted historical legacies as an 
important explanation for these divergent outcomes. Ken Jowitt (1993) claimed that the 
communist past would severely shape the course of the post-communist countries, and Andrew 
Janos (2000, 1993) argued that pre-communist differences would continue to be prominent 
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among the post-communist countries despite five decades of communist rule. There now exist 
many studies that have used historical legacies to explain post-communist outcomes, such as 
regime change (Moller 2009, Pop‐Eleches 2007, Ekiert 2003, Horowitz 2003, Bunce 1999), 
growth variation (De Melo et al. 2001, Katchanovski 2000), democracy and democratization 
(Bunce 2005, Kopstein 2003, Roeder 1999), institutional quality (Dimitrova‐Grajzl 2007), post-
transition elections (Darden and Grzymala-Busse 2006), political party development (Grzymala-
Busse 2002, Kitschelt 1999, Ishiyama 1997) and lastly, corruption (Sandholtz and Taagepera 
2005, Møller and Skaaning 2010).  
As noted, this thesis focuses on the topic covered by the last of the abovementioned studies: it is 
concerned with the empirical relationship between historical legacies and corruption. Thus, the 
research question is the following: Can post-communist levels of corruption be explained by 
historical legacies? Evidence suggests it can. However, estimating the causal effect of historical 
legacies on levels of post-communist corruption is not easy: it is complicated by the intertwined 
nature of historical causes. In other words, it is easier to say that historical legacies matter jointly 
than it is to identify which legacies matter the most.  
By post-communist all countries of the former Soviet Union, the Soviet satellite-states of Eastern 
Europe, former Yugoslavia, Albania, Bulgaria, and Romania are included. It will be clear 
throughout the thesis what is meant by historical legacies.  
The research question is analyzed by using quantitative hypothesis tests based on time-series 
cross-section analysis (TSCS). In particular, a Prais-Winsten (PW) transformed regression model 
with panel-corrected standard errors (PCSE) is applied. The TSCS design overcomes the “small-
N” problem that characterizes many post-communist studies. Therefore, it is capable of testing 
hypotheses drawn from the global cross-national literature.  
1.1 Relevance of the Research Question  
1.1.1 Societal Contribution 
The research question of this thesis – whether historical legacies can explain levels of post-
communist corruption – has societal relevance. Take for example the harmful effects of 
corruption. Transparency International describes corruption as: 
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one of the greatest challenges of the contemporary world. It undermines good 
government, fundamentally distorts public policy, leads to the misallocation of resources, 
harms the public sector and private sector development and particularly hurts the poor.
1
  
If this statement is true, corruption has the potential to destroy one of the central attributes of 
democracy: impartiality. Rothstein and Teorell (2008) define impartiality as the equal treatment 
of those who are equal by law or policy. When corruption occurs, democratic governance risks 
becoming particularistic: it treats unequally those who are equal. This will indeed move power 
from the electorate and into the hands of hidden influencers, damaging transparency and 
accountability.  
These issues seem even more acute when viewing them in a post-communist context. According 
to Rose, “Corruption is the greatest obstacle to progress in the post-communist countries” (Rose 
2001:105). If these countries are to make a successful transition to full-fledged democracies they 
need to reduce corruption. However, if one is to reduce corruption one must first understand its 
causes. If not, one risks implementing ill-defined measures.  
As will be shown later in this thesis several scholars highlight historical legacies as important 
causes when trying to understand the post-communist corruption problem. Some point to the 
particular legacy of communism and its inherent tendency to promote corruption, others point to 
the pre-communist legacies. Nevertheless, we need increased knowledge about the connection 
between historical legacies and corruption. This might be important for the sake of knowledge 
itself, but it will be even more important as a mean for creating awareness about the particular 
post-communist corruption ‘problematique’ – and finding sound measures to inhibit it. The post-
communist countries must not be enslaved by their past. In that regard, deepening the knowledge 
about the empirical link between historical legacies and corruption might help their emancipation.    
However, it is important not to exaggerate the importance of our empirical findings. One 
scientific study does not have the ability to establish truth. But if we are able to aggregate the 
empirical evidence of many studies, it may move us closer to something of an approximate truth. 
The current thesis aims to contribute to the latter. However, this concerns the area of scientific 
relevance, which is the next topic up for discussion.  
                                                 
1
 http://transparency.org.au/index.php/about-us/mission-statement/ 
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1.1.2 Scientific Contribution 
As already noted, there are several studies that try to assess the relationship between historical 
legacies, and post-communist outcomes. The number of studies investigating the relationship 
between historical legacies and post-communist corruption are, however, less numerous. Møller 
and Skaaning (2010) and  Sandholtz and Taagepera (2005) are the most important ones and deal 
with the topic directly.
2
  
The first study is quantitative and tries to assess the empirical relationship between bureaucratic 
legacies and post-communist corruption. What they find, by building on prior work from Herbert 
Kitschelt, is that the variation in levels of post-communist corruption to a large degree can be 
explained by the variation in pre-communist bureaucratic legacies. The second study is also 
quantitative and focuses on culture. They find empirical evidence for the fact that communism 
pushed societies towards ‘survival’ values, which in turn caused higher corruption levels. Even 
though the current study, in line with Møller and Skaaning (2010), argues that pre-communist 
factors has more explanatory power than “communist” factors, it is important to know the 
arguments presented by Sandholtz and Taagepera (2005).  However, the fact that there are only 
two quantitative studies available calls for increased attention to the topic in order to strengthen 
findings further.  
The most valuable contribution of this thesis to the current area of research is that it strengthens 
confidence in previous findings. By using updated TSCS data on three different measures of the 
dependent variables, and a wide range of control variables, it reaches the conclusion that 
historical legacies can explain levels of post-communist corruption. These legacies are also 
remarkably robust even when relevant proximate variables are included. Such an empirical 
analysis with this kind of data has not, as the author is aware of, been done before in the post-
communist corruption literature. Amongst the hypotheses, H2 – that the variation in levels of 
post-communist corruption largely can be explained by variations in pre-communist bureaucratic 
legacies – gains the most support. However, even though the combined effect of historical 
legacies seems to be a powerful explanation, it is difficult to speak of the effect of individual 
legacies with any real certainty.    
                                                 
2
 Holmes (2006) also writes about historical legacies and post-communist corruption.  However, he has a qualitative 
focus and will therefore mainly be referred to for theoretical purposes. It is also worth mentioning that Treisman 
(2003) touches upon the topic.  
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1.2 Organization of Thesis  
The thesis is structured as follows. Chapter two starts by presenting and defending the theoretical 
definition of the dependent variable: corruption. It is explained why corruption is a slippery 
concept to define and what characteristics are included in the chosen definition. Then, a similar 
approach is taken when defining the key independent variable: historical legacies. In particular, it 
is argued that the legacy paradigm needs to be understood within the larger framework of 
historical institutionalism in order to be a concept apt for analytical purposes.  
Next, with basis in the work of Møller and Skaaning (2010) and the global corruption literature, 
the central theoretical framework is established. From this, the following four hypotheses are 
deduced. (1) Post-communist countries are more corrupt than other countries; (2) a protestant 
heritage should reduce post-communist corruption levels; (3) variation in levels of post-
communist corruption can largely be explained by variations in pre-communist bureaucratic 
legacies; and (4) a Western imperial legacy should decrease post-communist corruption levels.   
Chapter three explains why a quantitative approach was chosen, and why TSCS data is well 
suited to answer the chosen research question. Two related points are especially highlighted: its 
ability to overcome the “small-n” problem that often characterizes post-communist studies, and 
therefore the possibility to test hypotheses drawn from the global corruption literature.  
The fourth chapter explains the case selection for this study, and shows how the relevant 
theoretical variables are operationalized. A quite thorough discussion of the quality of corruption 
data is included here. However, treating corruption data as TSCS data poses some potentially 
serious reliability-challenges – since sources used to obtain the corruption indexes have changed 
over time. In other words, what the indexes actually measure can vary from year to year. Despite 
these obvious flaws, the current thesis argue that it is better to say something with imperfect 
measures than to wait for perfect measures, and say nothing at all. In addition, this thesis is more 
interested in variation between countries than variation over time, which minimizes the danger of 
drawing faulty over-time statistical inferences.  
Chapter five presents and discusses findings. Hypotheses are tested across different data, models 
and sample sizes, in order to assess robustness. Methodological challenges arising because of the 
intertwined nature of legacies are also addressed. In addition, the legacy variables are tested 
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against alternative explanations, which consist of (temporally) proximate variables that could 
influence corruption.  
Finally, in chapter six, the thesis ends with a conclusion and a discussion on what implications 
findings have both for previous and future research.  
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2. Theoretical Framework: Post-Communist Corruption and 
Historical Legacies 
This chapter begins by explaining the theoretical definition of the concept underlying the 
dependent variable: corruption. It then continues by dealing with the theoretical concepts 
underlying historical legacies, which is the key independent variable. To be able to operationalize 
these two variables we need meaningful theoretical definitions: we need to know what corruption 
and historical legacies are, and what they are not. Hence, this part of the chapter defends and 
explains the chosen theoretical definitions. The chapter proceeds with a section on previous 
research with a special emphasis on the study by Møller and Skaaning (2010) and on the causes 
of corruption identified by the global corruption literature. The chapter ends with the deduction of 
hypotheses.  
2.1 Definition of Concepts: Corruption 
2.1.1 Definition of the Current Study 
Corruption is here defined as “the misuse of public office for private gain” (Treisman 2007:1). 
There are two central attributes about this definition worth noticing. First, the term ‘public office’ 
implies an emphasis on public corruption rather than private corruption. The present study thus 
maintains that corruption is by definition a public sector phenomenon. Second, the term ‘private 
gain’ emphasizes the notion of private enrichment. It may not be straightforward, but at least in 
the current study private gain introduces a distinct material attribute to the concept. This means 
that corruption must, directly or indirectly, have a material character. Calling someone corrupt 
because of his or her degraded morality will therefore not qualify as corruption. This definition is, 
however, narrower than how corruption has been understood historically. 
Corruption stems from the Latin word corrumpere where ‘cor’ can be translated with ‘total’ and 
‘rumpere’ means something like decay or rotten (Mikkelsen 2013) The term can relate to 
societies as a whole or to individuals and their acts. According to Johnston (1996), the term 
corruption, in the ‘classical view,’ refers to societies and/or individuals that have fallen short 
from a standard of virtue and goodness. However, the danger becomes apparent if we use this 
original meaning of corruption for contemporary academic studies. An imprecise definition risks 
blurring the borders of a concept until it becomes useless for both inquiry and comparison 
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(Mikkelsen 2013:3). This danger is present in the corruption literature because corruption is a 
slippery concept to define. To avoid conceptual weaknesses researchers must make conscious 
choices when picking definitions of corruption. Hence, some comments must be made about the 
difficulties plaguing the corruption concept.  
2.1.2 The Problematic Nature of the Concept of Corruption 
Despite the heightened awareness among scholars about the importance of understanding and 
explaining corruption we still lack consensus, both academically and legally, on how to define 
corruption.  According to Lancaster and Montinola (1997:188) the task is difficult because the 
phenomenon of corruption is plagued by cultural relativism: what seems like corrupt behavior to 
some may not be corruption to others. Second, even though most of the literature identifies 
corruption with deviations from some kind of norm or ideal, it has not been completely clear 
what corruption actually deviates from (Carvajal 1999:337).
3
  
Despite these definitional challenges, there seem to be agreements among scholars upon some 
characteristics. The most important ones are misuse of public office, incompatibility with public 
opinion, violation of public interest, violations of the law and agent-client relationships. Not all of 
these characteristics are included in the corruption definition used in this thesis. However, in the 
following they will all be explained, and the ones included in the definition will be defended.  
2.1.3 Characteristics Included in the Definition 
Misuse of Public Office 
There is not complete agreement whether corruption always has to involve misuse of public 
office but, nevertheless, it is the definitional attribute most commonly used in works on 
corruption (Lancaster and Montinola 1997:188).  Joseph Nye, one the earliest scholars applying a 
public-office standard, defined corruption as: 
behavior which deviates from the formal duties of a public role because of private-
regarding (personal, close family, private clique) pecuniary or status gains; or violates 
rules against the exercise of certain types of private-regarding influence (1967:419).  
                                                 
3
 However, impartiality – “that public institutions should operate in an impartial rule-based manner” (Linde 2009:3) 
– is gaining ground as the positive referent for corruption. 
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There are two factors inherent in this definition worth emphasizing. First, corruption is a 
violation of trust. A public role carries with it certain duties and these are breached whenever a 
public officer engages in corrupt behavior. Decisions which in their nature should be both non-
discriminatory and objective – that its, they should be impartial – are suddenly for sale (Rothstein 
and Teorell 2008). Second, the motivation for the corrupter is private benefits. This point (as 
briefly touched upon on the page above) is of such importance that, even though it is included in 
the ‘public office’ characteristic, it will be dealt with as a separate characteristic in the next 
section. 
Definitions of corruption that include the characteristic of public office are often viewed as more 
‘objective’ compared to, for example, public interest definitions. This is because they classify 
corrupt behavior by using legal norms as a reference point, while the latter definitions emphasize 
what a society perceives to be corruption. Because of the reference to legal norms ‘public office-
definitions’ scores high when it comes to operationability: it is relatively easy to discern what 
constitutes breaking formal rules or regulations and, at least in principle, it is quite observable 
(Kurer 2005:225). However, there are three important criticisms that have been raised against the 
public office characteristic.  
The first one is accurately summarized by Rose-Ackerman: “One does not condemn a Jew for 
bribing his way out of a concentration camp” (1978:9). The critique inherent in this example is 
that a public office definition conflicts with popular understanding: it deems corrupt what the 
public opinion does not regard as corrupt, and vice versa. Even though several criticisms towards 
public office-definitions highlight its failure to conform to public opinion, the particular example 
from Rose-Ackerman seems to rely on a misunderstanding. As Kurer (2005:225) points out, it is 
not the exemplified prisoner that is corrupt, it is the guard. Only the formal transgression by the 
official can be regarded as corrupt behavior, and he is only corrupt because his primary 
motivation was private enrichment. Simply breaking the rules (letting the prisoner escape) cannot 
be classified as an act of corruption.  
The second criticism claims that the public office standard is culture-specific: upholding 
bureaucratic rules and regulations may be supported by Western norms and conventions but may 
be absent in other parts of the world. To answer this criticism one has to know whether deep 
disparities in perceived corruption actually exist. A thorough examination of this subject is not 
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within scope of the current study, but it suffices to say that the evidence are equivocal (Rose-
Ackerman 1999, Kurer 2005). If such disparities exist, international comparisons become 
difficult. One cannot make meaningful comparisons by applying a uniform and ‘objective’ 
concept on the inhabitants of a country that have ‘subjective’ perceptions of what constitutes 
corrupt behavior. On the other hand, such comparisons can be important regardless of ‘culture-
specific’ biases. This is of course only the case if one holds that the social, political and economic 
consequences of corruption are universal, despite definitional disagreements.  
Finally, the public office characteristic has been criticized for its ‘legality’ attribute: acts that are 
not forbidden by law are not corrupt (Kurer 2005). An identical act in two countries can be either 
corrupt or non-corrupt, depending on the laws of the country. Similarly, the definition cannot deal 
with instances where the law itself is corrupt.    
Private (material) Gain 
As mentioned, the term private gain is included in the public office standard. However, it is an 
important aspect of the definition worth elaborating on its own terms, especially since ‘private’ 
carries with it a distinct material character.  By including private gain in the definition we are 
able to exclude concepts that sometimes mistakenly are perceived as corruption, such as 
nepotism, clientelism, patronage and pork barrel politics. According to Rothstein and Teorell 
(2008) all these concepts are related to corruption through the superset of ‘particular governing.’4  
However, corruption distinguishes itself from other forms of ‘particular governing’ (Rothstein 
and Teorell 2008) by having material gain as its main goal and not political support (clientelism), 
administrative control (patronage), preferential treatment of friends/relatives (nepotism) or 
electoral support by favoring constituencies for government funds (pork-barrel politics) 
(Kopecký and Scherlis 2008). Private gain, however, must not be equated with individual gain. 
Although it could be argued that the latter is a viable approach, material gains from corruption 
can be directed towards groups. Empirically this is observed both in relation to organizations and 
political parties (Mikkelsen 2013:11). Nevertheless, in either case the meaning is the same: the 
misuse of public office for private and material gain. As long as ‘misuse’ means breaches of 
public duty and ‘private gain’ is not equated with individual gain, but still understood as 
                                                 
4
 For an excellent discussion about the conceptualization of corruption and how it is connected to the superset of 
particular governing, see Mikkelsen (2013).  
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pertaining only material rewards,
5
 the current definition is both theoretically embedded and 
operationally relevant. However, the latter is not similar to monetary rewards.  
Some principal-agent definitions of corruption have tried to de-emphasize the importance of 
private material gain. For example, Klitgaard says that “corruption occurs when an agent betrays 
the principal’s interest in pursuit of her own” (1988:24). The problem, however, with leaving out 
the characteristic of private material gain is that without it, betrayal of trust becomes a sufficient 
condition for classifying corrupt acts. Essentially, this makes it impossible to distinguish 
corruption from cheating (Kurer 2005:226).  
2.1.4 Characteristics Excluded from the Definition  
Violation of Public Interest 
Some scholars view corruption as behavior that deviates from public interest. According to 
Rogow and Laswell (1970) corruption promotes special interest by violating a system of public 
and civic order that tries to promote the common interest. Morris (1991) reflects the same 
argument when he claims that corrupt behavior does not align with the pursuit of the common 
good, which he argues are embodied in a society’s ideology or law.  
However, definitions centered on public interest have been criticized for being too vague. Who 
should decide what are in the public interest? As Theobald (1990) points out, modern pluralistic 
societies have many different ‘publics,’ each with unique interests. Second, almost any action can 
be justified as promoting the common good (Peters and Welch 1978).
6
  
Incompatibility with Public Opinion 
Public opinion-definitions of corruption hold that the definitional attributes of corruption are 
determined by ‘the public,’ or some parts of it (Scott 1972:3-4). Public opinion-definitions are 
somehow unique in the definitional corruption debate because of their dual role as both a source 
for a definition and as a criterion for evaluating other definitions. The latter point refers to the 
common practice in the literature to make conformity to public opinion a criterion for assessing 
the quality of the definition of corruption (Kurer 2005:224). As noted earlier, this is one of the 
critiques against the public-office definition.  
                                                 
5
 However, material rewards are not similar to monetary rewards. A box of whiskey or an opportunity for insider 
trading is material rewards even though money is not directly involved.  
6
 For example, some kinds of corruption (so-called ’honest graft’) have been thought to promote public interest.  
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One of the central criticisms against public opinion definitions regards its high degree of 
‘subjectivity’: there is probably not agreement among the public as to what makes up corruption. 
Because of this disagreement, who is to decide which view that matters (Kurer 2005:224)? In 
other words, the definition has obvious flaws when it comes to operationability. Because of this 
weakness it is tempting to reject the definition wholesale. However, this is probably too harsh. 
Despite its weakness when it comes to operationalization it is precisely these types of definitions 
that have become the foundations for the common international comparisons of levels of 
corruption. The most famous is Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index (CPI), 
which is based on subjective perceptions from selected members of the public. Several scholars 
have criticized the CPI for its methodological weaknesses (Treisman 2007, Knack 2006). 
Nevertheless, it is widely used. Hence, the authors of such indexes and those scholars using them 
must believe that there exists a sufficient common understanding of what constitutes corrupt 
behavior. Furthermore, what the public thinks is corrupt behavior can be valuable information in 
itself. It can help design better anti-corruption programs and it can lead to increased knowledge 
about how a conflict between values (perception) and formal rules affects corruption levels.  
Nevertheless, public opinion is not included as a definitional characteristic in the current thesis. 
The main reason is that it fails the operationability test. What people perceive to be corruption is 
an unsecure definitional basis in a cross-country comparison. That being said, this thesis will use 
indexes of perceived corruption as data for the empirical analysis. This is not ideal. It creates a 
mismatch between theory and the empirical findings, which are an inherent weakness in the 
current thesis. However, the perception-based measures are the best data available. The author is 
of the opinion that it is better to say something with imperfect measures than to wait for perfect 
measures, and probably never get a chance to contribute to the scholarly debate.   
Principal-Agent Relationships  
According to principal-agent definitions corruption occurs whenever an agent substitutes the 
principal’s interest for his own. Banfield defines an agent as “a person who has accepted an 
obligation to act on behalf of his principal in some range of matters and, in doing so, to serve the 
principal’s interests as if it were his own” (1975:587-588). The obvious mistake of equating 
corruption with betrayal of the principal’s interest has already been noted. Hence, it seems like 
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the ‘principal-agent’ framework is better suited as a method of analysis than for definitional 
purposes (Kurer 2005:226).         
2.2 Definition of Concepts: Historical Legacies 
2.2.1 Definition of the Current Study 
Historical legacies are here defined as, “the structural, cultural and institutional starting point of 
ex-communist countries at the outset of transition” (Pop‐Eleches 2007:910). As is seen, the 
particular post-communist context is included in the definition from the beginning.  
The study of historical legacies in the post-communist literature has one special characteristic: it 
often heavily emphasizes the communist past. This is, of course, not surprising since the 
communist period probably has shaped the post-communist countries in several ways. However, 
if historical legacies are to be treated as a well-defined analytical concept it must be clear when 
we mean the communist past and when we generally refer to historical causes. The current study 
concerns itself with the latter. This does not mean that the communist experience is not 
important. It is. However, this thesis makes the claim that historical legacies preceding the 
communist period are the most important ones. As we shall see later, it can be argued that 
variables that try to capture historical legacies dating back to the communist period actually (to a 
large degree) capture pre-communist phenomenon. However, before we delve into that discussion 
we must address the definitional difficulties arising when we try to use historical legacies as an 
analytical concept.   
2.2.2 Definitional Difficulties 
The post-communist literature lacks a uniform approach as to how to deal with historical 
legacies. This is problematic. If we don’t know with certainty what constitutes a concept there 
will be a mismatch between its theoretical definition and its analytical usage. Nevertheless, 
legacies are often applied as a causal factor in post-communist studies, and it is used in at least 
four different ways. 
First, the term ‘legacy’ often becomes a synonym for the communist past. The substance of the 
legacy is usually not specified but the argument is that the post-communist countries need to 
address their past in order to take hold of the future. However, it is not clear what this legacy is 
and is not. Second, some studies use legacy as the outcome of interest. This means that the legacy 
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becomes the dependent variable and within a causal framework. Researchers using this approach 
would for example be interested in questions like why some legacies survived the communist 
past while others did not. Third, legacy is also used as an independent variable and plays a causal 
role in explaining some post-communist phenomenon. This is the approach for the present study. 
Finally, communist legacies can also be applied in a more indirect way. For example as a variable 
that limits actor’s choices within a particular decision-making environment. Valerie Bunce 
(1999) argues in her study of post-communist economic reform that the particular communist 
past constrained the reform options available and also to a large degree influenced which political 
leaders were able to contend for power. The last two usages – as an independent and indirect 
variable – are the most widely used approaches within the post-communist legacy literature.   
However, it is not enough to just be able to treat legacy as a causal factor. Several other important 
questions need to be addressed in order to deal with legacies in an analytical sound way. First, are 
historical legacies linked to a political regime or is the concept broader so that it encompasses 
any phenomenon that occurred during the specific period? This study argues for the former. An 
earthquake during the communist period, with its material and social effects, are not considered a 
legacy. As will become clear later, legacies refer to political, economic or social factors that 
originate from human action.  
Secondly, must one identify causal mechanisms in order to speak of legacies? Kitschelt (2003), 
and to a lesser degree Wittenberg (2010), believes so. According to the former, the process of 
how an historical feature influences a contemporary phenomenon must be specified. If not, we 
cannot assume a causal relationship. However, most studies on historical legacies in the post-
communist literature fail to address causal mechanisms directly. Rather the focus is on 
correlations between features in the pre-communist/communist era and the post-communist 
period, which is interpreted as evidence of legacies. Furthermore, a firm grasp on the causal 
mechanisms is important in order assess the relative explanatory power of legacies compared to 
competing causal explanations. This is crucial in order to make the legacy paradigm contribute to 
the current field of research.  
Finally, we need to understand on what level of abstraction a legacy is thought to act or, in other 
words, what our unit of analysis is. This is important in the building of shared standards about the 
assumptions and practices of legacy arguments. That is why this chapter contains a description of 
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a typology for historical legacies. But first we must show that the legacy approach is not a 
rootless concept: it is connected to the larger theoretical paradigm of historical institutionalism.   
2.2.3 Conceptualizing Historical Legacies 
Legacies and Historical Institutionalism  
Using legacy as a causal factor is an approach situated within a larger tradition of using historical 
factors as causes of current outcomes. The most known of these traditions is historical 
institutionalism. In the words of Charles Tilly, historical institutionalism is a method for 
measuring “big structure, large processes and making huge comparisons.” Both legacy 
explanations and historical institutionalism focuses on historical processes, the timing of events 
and the lasting effect of these events. However, the latter does this by applying two distinct 
concepts: path dependence and critical junctures. These concepts deserve some attention.  
In political science path dependence is about the self-reinforcing processes in a political system. 
The logic is that once a particular path is chosen, the self-reinforcing nature of path dependence 
makes it increasingly difficult to reverse that course. Political alternatives that once existed can, 
at this stage, be totally out of reach. Thus, when viewing politics in a path dependent framework, 
beginnings resemble crossroads and become extremely important areas of study. Or in Paul 
David’s words, path dependence is “the idea of history as an irreversible branching process” 
(2001:8). Path dependence, and historical institutionalism, emphasizes the “stickiness” of 
institutions, which means that the consequences of a particular institution typically outlive its 
initial purpose. The reason that these consequences persist is because of path-dependent 
dynamics that “lock in” on the path chosen, even though the initial purpose of the institution have 
vanished.  In other words, the political reality and the decisions available are inherently 
conditioned by choices made at earlier times. Historical legacies also seem to be characterized by 
this kind of “stickiness.”     
The other central concept in historical institutionalism is critical junctures. Critical junctures are 
events that disrupt the normal state of continuity, and these disruptions create new institutional 
configurations that eventually form a new path. Hall and Taylor (1996:942) calls it “moments 
when substantial institutional change takes place, thereby creating a ‘branching point’ from 
which historical development moves onto a new path.” Scholars don’t agree whether choices are 
16 
 
constrained in these periods or not. Some argue that during critical junctures agency is at the core 
– both in terms of the impact of choices and the number of alternatives available.7 Others have 
the opinion that “not everything is up for grabs during critical junctures” (LaPorte and Lussier 
2011:651). They rather believe that conditions preceding the critical juncture in some way will 
circumscribe the choices eventually available for the actors.
8
    
Even though historical institutionalism and the legacy paradigm share a similar commitment to 
the study of historical causes, they also exhibit important differences. This is especially the case 
with the definition of legacy, and what role critical junctures play in creating and/or shaping these 
legacies. In historical institutionalism critical junctures produce legacies. For example, in their 
study of political stability in Latin America, Collier and Collier (1991) define the critical juncture 
as the moment when the political arena opened for labor movements, which helped create a 
distinct legacy of regime instability in Latin America. Considering post-communist historical 
legacies from this point of view implies that we, for example, view the establishment of 
communism as the critical juncture, rather than its breakdown. However, in the legacies 
paradigm, legacies are considered factors that survived the critical juncture. This means that they 
existed both before and after the “path divergence.” Thus, in our case, the critical juncture is the 
breakdown of communism. Most of the early post-communist literature focused on this critical 
juncture and the point of intersection between institutional factors inherited from communism 
and those stemming from proximate action.  
Another point of divergence between historical institutionalism and the legacies paradigm is that 
not all legacies are institutions. If they were the two approaches could be merged. However, as 
mentioned above, legacies also manifest themselves in attitudes and behaviors and not just only 
as institutions in the way historical institutionalism regards them.      
In order to have a common understanding of the role of historical causes the two approaches 
needs to address their divergences. In addition, the legacies paradigm needs to resolve some of its 
own flaws. This is especially the case when dealing with the question of whether legacies imply 
all historical causes or whether some of the causes are legacies and some of them just represents 
                                                 
7
 See Katznelson (2003).  
8
 See Collier and Collier (1991).  
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“background” conditions. This is important to clarify because it is reasonable to believe that not 
all historical factors are part of a causal process.       
There are several gains from integrating the legacies paradigm into the broader approach of 
historical institutionalism. Firstly, historical institutionalism offers a framework for explaining 
institutional reproduction, which the legacy paradigm lacks. One of these is the “constant cause” 
explanation. Essentially, the constant cause explanations means that the same factors that 
explained the birth of the institution also can explain its development over time. Another, rather 
contrary explanation is that institutions get renegotiated from time to time leaving or redirecting 
some institutional configurations while others are kept (Thelen 2004). These theories help 
answering some important questions within the legacies paradigm.  Furthermore, the legacies 
paradigm can enrich historical institutionalism, especially empirically, through all its studies of 
different post-communist cases. By placing the legacy paradigm within that of historical 
institutionalism we have laid a proper foundation that enables us to use legacies in an empirical 
analysis. However, before we turn to the application of this theoretical paradigm, a typology of 
historical legacies might make the concept even more available for analytical purposes.    
Developing a Typology of Historical Legacies 
Going from mere descriptions of legacies to a typology of legacies has several advantages. First, 
it helps us in the concept formation: it clarifies the meaning of the concept, places it in its proper 
place both with related concepts and hierarchically structures the inherent parts of the concept 
itself. Secondly it provides us with meaningful “data containers,” which enhances measurement 
of actual cases within the conceptual framework. Legacies can be conceptualized along two 
dimensions: the domain on which the legacy is situated and the unit of analysis in which it 
operates. The first dimension is comprised by the categories of political, economic and social. It 
seems difficult to find a legacy that cannot be properly categorized within these three domains. 
The second dimension is made up of three different levels of analysis: institutional, attitudinal 
and behavioral. By combining these two dimensions the chosen categories becomes mutually 
exclusive and able to provide a nuanced and rigorous classification of legacies.  
The institutional level of analysis constitutes the broadest type of legacy. It includes structures, 
organizations, and norms/practices created by these. All variables in the current study are located 
at this level. Political legacies could refer to most features of the political regime, the nature of 
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political opposition and degree of political reforms. Economical institutional legacies could refer 
to collectivized agriculture, state ownership of resources, minimal production of consumer goods, 
centralized economic planning, and lack of property rights. Social/cultural institutional legacies 
are things like for example religion and ethnic fragmentation. Even though this thesis only 
focuses on the institutional level, the two other levels (attitudinal and behavioral) will be briefly 
commented so that we have a complete understanding of the typology.  
The second level of analysis, attitudinal legacies, constitutes expectations and attitudes of both 
individuals and groups of individuals. A political attitudinal legacy can be support for a strong 
authoritarian leader while an economical attitudinal legacy can be the belief in a strong 
governmental involvement in the economy. The expectations of social services and government 
provisions can be a social attitudinal legacy.  
The third and final level of analysis is behavioral legacies. These legacies are similar to the 
attitudinal level in that it applies to individuals or groups of individuals, but instead of attitudes 
its focus is on specific actions and inactions. A political behavioral legacy can for example be a 
voter’s response to the risk of political violence. An economical behavioral legacy can be to use 
the shadow economy to buy goods and services that are difficult to produce or too expensive to 
buy in the formal economy. Finally, a social behavioral legacy can be the use of informal 
networks for transactions and favors that otherwise would have been channeled through the 
bureaucracy or some political representative body.         
The strength of this typology is its capacity, through its two dimensions, to systematically 
organize the different types of legacies and still contain a rigorous level of detail. Furthermore, 
when a legacy has appropriately been placed within one of the cells in the typology how to 
measure the phenomena becomes clearer. The typology will be displayed in a table after the 
characteristics of the definition have been explained.  
2.2.4 Characteristics Included in the Definition 
The current definition is formulated in such a way that it could encompass a whole range of 
different legacies. To help clarify the definition, this thesis organizes historical legacies for post-
communist countries along four key dimensions: (1) cultural/religious legacies, (2) economic 
legacies, (3) social conditions/modernization legacies, and (4) institutional legacies.  Because 
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these four dimensions will be extensively laid out later in the thesis, I will only make some brief 
comments about them here.  
Cultural/Religious legacies  
There are, as noted when dealing with the causes of corruption, several cultural/religious legacies 
that can affect corruption. First, a protestant religious heritage (compared to Islam, Orthodox 
Christianity and Catholicism) has showed to be associated with lower levels of corruption 
(Lambsdorff 2005, Treisman 2007). Second, imperial legacy is thought to influence post-
communist outcomes. It seems like institutions, civic values and national ideas in those countries 
formerly part of the Habsburg Empire are differently influenced than those countries under either 
Russian or Ottoman rule (Dimitrova‐Grajzl 2007, Møller and Skaaning 2010).  
Economic legacies 
The existing literature seems to highlight four kinds of economic legacies relevant for post-
communist countries: natural resources, trade dependence and structural factors related to the 
economy. For example, De Melo et al. (2001) has demonstrated the relevance, and potentially 
powerful constraining effects, of these legacies.  
Social conditions/modernization 
When the communist countries transitioned they were characterized by considerable differences 
in socioeconomic development. Interestingly, this was the case despite the communist’s strong 
efforts to erase pre-communist differences. According to modernization theory these differing 
socioeconomic levels should have predicted the following democratization process. The 
accurateness of the modernization theory can of course be questioned, but if it is true, 
developments supporting democratization should at the same time inhibit corruption (Treisman 
2000:404). Legacies in belonging to this dimension could be things like economic development 
at the outset of the transition, degree of urbanization, distribution of literacy and higher education 
etc.  
Institutional legacies  
Despite their common experience of one-party rule, the transition countries also differed 
significantly when it came to institutional legacies. Some of these variations were possibly 
connected to late-communist reforms, but a significant part seemed to be caused by deeper 
20 
 
historical legacies (Pop‐Eleches 2007:912). Examples of such legacies could be the already 
mentioned variable of bureaucratic legacies, but also things like pre-war membership in the 
Soviet Union, historical experience with democracy etc.  
In table 1 below all the legacy-dimensions are presented by applying the mentioned typology of 
historical legacies. In addition, the variables considered in the later analysis are also included so 
that the full potential of the typology can be seen.  
Table 1: A typology of histoircal legacies considered in the current thesis* 
 Political Economic Social/cultural 
Institutional Bureaucratic legacy 
History of statehood 
Prior democracy 
Pre-war Soviet republic 
Resource endowments 
Energy intensity 
GDP/cap 1989 
Trade dependence 
Protestant heritage 
Muslim  
Minorities 
Imperial legacy 
Urbanization 1989 
Attitudinal    
Behavioral    
Note: * As will be seen later, not all these variables will be included in the final analysis. Methodological constraints 
and issues related to the data resulted in the exclusion of several potentially relevant variables. However, they were 
all considered. Sources will be listed at the end of this chapter.  
 
2.2.5 Characteristics Excluded from the Definition  
Geography 
Geography is the only dimension that explicitly is excluded from this analysis. Several scholars 
emphasize the importance of geography when explaining political development and corruption 
(La Porta et al. 1999, Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 2002, Sandholtz and Gray 2003, 
Gerring and Thacker 2005). However, in this study, geography does not qualify as a legacy. Of 
course, things like proximity to the West and closeness to the EU will probably be correlated with 
lower corruption levels. Nevertheless, geography does not take agency (actions of human beings) 
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into account, and the political consequences of location are considered for (at least indirectly) in 
other variables, such as for example incentives for EU-integration.
9
  
To summarize, historical legacies are now placed within the larger theoretical paradigm of 
historical institutionalism and it consist of four characteristics/dimensions: cultural/religious, 
economic, social conditions/modernization and institutional. The next section introduces relevant 
previous research, and how these should be understood in order to build a proper theoretical 
framework suite for empirical analysis.  
2.3 Previous Research 
2.3.1 Determinants of Post-Communist Corruption    
When studying post-communist corruption one characteristic is striking: the inherent variation in 
corruption levels among the cases. Since all these countries share a common historical experience 
with communism, a more uniform picture is expected. However, according to Møller and 
Skaaning this diversity indicates that the communist legacy has little explanatory power, “after 
all, a uniform point of departure cannot account for a terminus of diversity” (2010:322).10 Thus, 
according to them, other historical factors must be important.  
When studying figure 1 (page below), we can see that corruption levels follow a clear geographic 
pattern. The most corrupt states are the central Asian countries. The less corrupt states are the 
Baltic and central European countries, and the intermediate states are found among the Balkan 
countries.  
Put differently, a tripartite division occurs that more or less coincide with historical and cultural 
regions. Furthermore, this clear geographical pattern fits badly with the idea that proximate 
explanations (initial power balance, EU-conditionality, economic reforms, etc.) could be the 
decisive factors. It is hard to see how explanations relying on actors choices could produce such a 
distinct geographical pattern. Rather, the diversity indicates that one have to trace deep 
(structural) historical legacies in order to explain the present diversity in corruption levels. This is 
                                                 
9
 These variables can be found in the section testing for alternative explanations (chapter 5).  
10
 However, this line of argument requires that one indeed think of the communist past as a “uniform” phenomenon. 
Ekiert (2003) points out that the communist legacy was characterized by a systematic diversity, and this can explain 
the present diversity in corruption levels among the post-communist countries. Nevertheless, the argument from 
Møller and Skaaning (2010) is that pre-communist variables counts more than “communist” variables.  
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not strange when one takes into account that each subregion probably faces the same structural 
constraints and similar historical trajectories (Møller and Skaaning 2010:322). This argument is 
in line with the concept of path dependency mentioned earlier, and it is also a point stressed by 
Herbert Kitschelt (1999, 2003) in several works. 
 
 
Note: The index is inverted so that 0 represent a clean government and 10 a completely corrupt government. Source: 
Transparency International.  
 
In the following we will look at two studies that more or less points to the same historical cause: 
imperial legacies - and the bureaucratic legacies inherited/created by these. The latter is the 
already mentioned study by Møller and Skaaning (2010). They argue that the diversity in post-
communist corruption must be explained by different bureaucratic legacies dating back to the 
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Figure 1:  Average corruption levels (2007-2010) in post-communist countries 
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pre-communist period. Second, we will look at a study by Dimitrova‐Grajzl (2007) that assess the 
role of different imperial legacies in relation to institutional development (which includes 
corruption). We start with the former.  
Bureaucratic Legacies and Post-Communist Corruption       
In their study of post-communist corruption Møller and Skaaning (2010) find strong support for 
the hypothesis that pre-communist bureaucratic legacies can explain current levels of post-
communist corruption.  
For their assessment of “bureaucratic legacies” they heavily rely on a framework developed by 
Kitschelt (1999, 2001, 2003). In comprised form, Kitschelt argues that post-communist outcomes 
are the result of structural features that were in place long before the communist regime 
crumbled. This is in contrast to more proximate explanations that rely on strategic interactions 
among actors when explaining these outcomes. While Kitschelt identified two “twin attributes” – 
bureaucratic legacy and “the power balance between communists and their challengers” – as the 
important structural factors, Møller and Skaaning only focus on bureaucratic legacy. This is, 
however, as they themselves point out, in line with Kitschelt’s own usage of the two factors since 
they overlap empirically. Second, bureaucratic legacy naturally becomes the most important 
factor when dealing with corruption. After all, (political) corruption is intrinsically linked with 
the governmental and bureaucratic sphere.   
The two structural factors identified by Kitschelt have their origin in the period between 1850 and 
the start of communism, and according to Kitschelt, these two factors have survived communism. 
Those countries with a favorable bureaucratic legacy were able to achieve some kind of 
bureaucratic professionalization during the communist period. This eventually helped prevent 
large-scale rent seeking after the breakdown of communism. Furthermore, a “favorable balance 
of power between communists and their challengers” helped form the civil society in such a way 
that it was able to speak up during the transition. Both these factors overlap empirically, but the 
critical point is that a “favorable legacy”, which produced bureaucratic professionalization and a 
civil society with a capacity to guard the guardians, must have had an adverse influence on 
corruption (Møller and Skaaning 2010:323). 
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When operationalizing bureaucratic legacies Kitschelt created a four-point scale that 
distinguished between (1) bureaucratic authoritarian, (2) national accommodative, (3) patrimonial 
communism and (4) colonial periphery. These classifications represent different communist 
regime forms but are based solely on the scoring on the two attributes (mentioned above) before 
the introduction of communism. Because of the argument that these structural factors got 
reproduced during communism, they can be said to measure pre-communist dividing lines 
(Møller and Skaaning 2010:324)        
The Czech Republic are, by Kitschelt, classified as the only ‘bureaucratic authoritarian’ regime. 
Hungary, Poland, Slovenia, the Slovak republic and the three Baltic states are all in the class of 
‘national accommodative communism.’ In the class of ‘patrimonial communism,’ we find 
Albania, Belarus, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Macedonia, Moldova, Romania, Russia, Serbia-
Montenegro and Ukraine. Finally, the remaining countries of Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, are all in the class of 
‘colonial periphery.’  
Table 2: Classification of post-communist countries and bureaucratic legacies 
Bureaucratic 
authoritarian 
National   
accommodative 
Patrimonial   
communism 
Colonial             
periphery 
Czech Republic Estonia Belarus Albania 
Slovenia Hungary Bosnia-Herzegovina Armenia 
 Latvia Bulgaria Azerbaijan 
 Lithuania Macedonia Georgia 
 Poland Moldova Kazakhstan 
 Slovak Republic Romania Kyrgyzstan 
  Russia Tajikistan 
  Serbia-Montenegro Turkmenistan 
  Ukraine Uzbekistan 
Source: Møller and Skaaning (2010).  
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Møller and Skaaning make some minor adjustment to this classification by elevating Slovenia to 
the status of bureaucratic authoritarian and relegating Albania to the status of colonial 
periphery.
11
 The current study follows this classification, and the ordering of countries is 
summarized in table 2 above.  
Basically, this four-point scale measures the ‘Weberianness’ of the pre-communist bureaucracy 
(Møller and Skaaning 2010:325), and both Kitschelt (1999) and Møller and Skaaning (2010) uses 
it in a regression analysis.       
A point that validates this empirical ordering of cases is that they reflect other classifications of 
pre-communist or communist legacies. Huntington’s (1996) distinction between western 
Christian, eastern Orthodox and Islamic civilizations is very similar to Kitschelt’s ordering if 
Kitschelt’s two first categories are merged.  Bunce (1999) and Ekiert (2003) also presents a 
similar geographical pattern although their emphasis is on the communist legacy, and not the pre-
communist legacy.  
Imperial Legacy and Post-Communist Corruption  
Similar to Kitschelt, Dimitrova‐Grajzl (2007) has also traced post-communist outcomes to pre-
communist legacies. She claims that the variation in institutional quality (which includes 
corruption) among the former socialist countries of South East and Central Europe can be 
explained by the legacies of the Ottoman and Habsburg Empires. Interestingly, she finds 
evidence that the communist experience did not change the prior “imperial” institutional 
development. Rather, in many cases, it even reinforced it (Dimitrova‐Grajzl 2007:540). In other 
words, it seems like the informal institutions inherited from the Habsburg and Ottoman empires, 
through path dependence, survived massive political and economic upheaval. This is similar to 
the findings of Møller and Skaaning. Post-communist outcomes must be understood by turning to 
deep (often pre-communist) historical explanations.  
Culture and Communism 
When investigating the links between culture, communism and corruption Sandholtz and 
Taagepera (2005) have provided an interesting study. Their findings are two-fold: first they argue 
                                                 
11
 This is done on the basis that it more accurately resembles historical realities. Especially, they rely on Seton-
Watson’s (1945) rigorous historiographical description of the countries between Germany and Russia, which was 
written before these countries came under Soviet hegemony.   
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that communism had a direct influence on corruption by facilitating structural incentives for 
corrupt behavior, second they point out that communism had an indirect effect on corruption 
through the way communism led societies towards ‘survival’ orientations which in turn promoted 
corruption.              
Even though communist countries were pushed towards secularism (which in the literature 
should have a negative effect on corruption) Sandholtz and Taagepera (2005) argue that it looks 
like the possible reward from secular values was overshadowed by the strong survival values that 
grew in the wake of communism. The communists probably did not intended this push towards 
survival values, but as Sandholtz and Taagepera (2005:116) show, it became an inevitable fact as 
economic development halted and people’s lives increasingly revolved around basic human 
needs. Thus, communism could have created a specific culture of corruption that now has turned 
into a legacy, which in turn affects levels of post-communist corruption.    
Other Studies Assessing the Relationship between Historical Legacies and Post-Communist 
Outcomes 
There are also several other studies that finds evidence for hypotheses predicting historical 
legacies to affect various post-communist political outcomes.  
Pop‐Eleches (2007) argue that post-communist regime outcomes have been substantially 
circumscribed by historical legacy differences. Even though he cannot answer the question of 
which particular legacy matters the most, Western Christianity appears as one of the strongest 
variables. In addition, the legacy explanations are robust even when pitted against several 
prominent alternative explanations.  
Grzegorz Ekiert (2003), in contrast to Møller and Skaaning (2010) and Dimitrova‐Grajzl (2007), 
emphasize the variety of communist legacies. He particularly points out how it influenced 
countries’ initial conditions, and that the most successful post-communist countries share 
common historical legacies.  According to him the communist region at the outset of the 
transition, was characterized by highly different domestic conditions and institutions. Countries 
such as Poland and Hungary had already experienced some degree of political liberalization and 
they had begun to develop organized political opposition (Ekiert 2003:111) 
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According to Valeri Bunce (1999) the decisive “legacy” factor are the patterns of political dissent 
during communism. In some countries the communist experience produced a viable and largely 
liberal opposition that according to Bunce (1999:790) was a “counter-regime-in-waiting.” In 
other countries no such protests were present, or if they were, they were illiberal in nature. Thus, 
when the communist party hegemony broke down these preferences and resource distributions 
manifested and either produced a new democratic regime or a continuation of the old 
authoritarian order  
Horowitz (2003) finds statistical evidence supporting the hypothesis that post-communist 
countries that had greater pre-communist political and economic achievements are more likely to 
embrace democracy.    
2.3.2 Causes of Corruption from the Global Corruption Literature 
Economic Development      
The most influential and consistent finding in the general corruption literature is that richer 
countries are less corrupt (Ades and Di Tella 1999, La Porta et. al. 1999, Montinola and Jackman 
2002, Treismann 2000, 2007). In other words, higher economic development is strongly 
correlated with lower levels of perceived corruption.  Both empirical and theoretical evidence are 
in favor of this finding.  
The modernization theory claimed that “the more well-to-do a country, the greater the chances it 
will sustain democracy” (Lipset 1960). Specifically, it was argued that economic development 
had a positive impact on democracy because it created participatory attitudes and a civic culture. 
Modernization introduced societal changes like urbanization, spread of education, literacy, 
depersonalized relationships and mass communications – and this produced a shift towards 
‘democratic’ attitudes. So, if the process of modernization creates attitudes of participation and 
democracy it should at the same time raise the odds for corrupt acts to be noticed and challenged. 
In other words, the exposure of corruption should be more likely in modernized countries. 
(Treisman 2000:404). Conversely, in countries with low economic development corruption will 
probably be more widespread.  
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Democracy 
Another important structural variable in the corruption literature is the longevity of democracy. 
Even though the literature has failed to establish a significant relationship between levels of 
democracy and lower corruption, long periods of exposure to democracy seems to be positively 
related to lower corruption (Treisman 2000, Gerring and Thacker 2005). The argument is quite 
straightforward.  
Democracy is built on structures and values that are inimical towards corruption, and thus it 
should inhibit it. Corruption requires special access and hidden influence which are directly 
opposed to the democratic ideals of equality and openness (Della Porta and Pizzorno 1996:74). 
However, the fight against corruption is not won just by implementing democracy: the important 
thing is the longevity of the democracy. The difference between a country that have a short 
experience with democracy and a country that has an extensive experience with democracy, is 
that in the latter country democratic norms and values have taken root and are widely shared. 
People expect equality before the law, there is a separation between the public and the private 
sphere, and office holders are obliged to serve the public will and not themselves. In such an 
environment people will regard corrupt actions as illegitimate and improper. The essential point 
is that it is hard for democratic structures to function properly without a potent political culture. 
In other words, democracy will not reduce corruption if the existing norms don’t condemn it 
(Sandholtz and Koetzle 2000:39). This is line with Eckstein’s (1988) socializing effect. 
Democratic norms are transmitted from one generation to another, and if this continues a 
democratic culture will spread both more widely and intensely to broader and broader segments 
of the population. Thus, more years of continuous democracy should tend to reduce corruption.  
Trade Openness       
A third structural variable is that countries that are more open to foreign trade tend to be less 
corrupt (Ades and Tella 1996, 1999), even though it is hard to establish the direction of causation. 
Presumably, trade openness and increased levels of competition reduces the power of bureaucrats 
over resources and administrative goods (permits, licenses etc.). This is important since 
bureaucrats could have traded these “goods” for private rewards. Furthermore, it is thought that 
increased foreign trade will lead to diffusion of norms and values, which lead us into arguments 
located at the political culture dimension. International trade is to a large degree dominated by 
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firms with a “Western” background. This means that their value system and business culture 
generally are non-acceptant to corrupt practices such as bribes, kickbacks, nepotism and 
extortion. So, when businesspeople and government officials from a “corrupt” country 
increasingly connects and “lock into” the international economy they will probably start to adopt 
more anti-corrupt attitudes (Sandholtz and Koetzle 2000:40).      
Natural Resources 
Fourth, natural resource endowments are thought to increase corruption (Ades and Di Tella 1999, 
Leite and Weidmann 1999). The basic assumption is that abundance of natural resources leads 
rent-seeking behavior, which leads to increased opportunities for corruption (Lambsdorff 
2005:25). Rents derived from natural resources such as oil, gas and minerals, are usually 
extremely valuable and can dramatically increase the amount of revenue in a country. The 
problem is that this increased state revenue can lead to corrupt public officials. Nigeria is a case 
in point.  
In the 1970’s Nigeria was generally no worse than other neighboring African states when it came 
to corruption. However, after they discovered oil-reserves several observers noted that the 
revenue from Nigeria’s new petroleum production created “extraordinary opportunities for 
corruption” (Ades and Di Tella 1999:982) According to The Economist (August 4, 1985) oil and 
corruption went hand in hand, making parties and party officials conspicuously rich.    
Presidentialism     
It has been argued that presidentialism could foster higher levels of corruption (Gerring and 
Thacker 2004:298). The assumption is that presidentialism creates a more fragmented political 
system through its decentralized model of governance, resulting in competing sources of power 
that are hard to keep responsible and accountable. Further, presidentialism is thought to be more 
susceptible to corruption because of such characteristics as fixed terms in office and legislative 
bargaining patterns (Kunicová and Rose-Ackerman 2005:598).     
Religion            
An often-cited cultural variable within the corruption literature is that countries with a 
predominantly Protestant population exhibit more quality governments and lower levels of 
corruption (Lambsdorff 2005, Treisman 2007). It is commonly thought that Protestantism is more 
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egalitarian and individualistic than the ‘hierarchical religions’ of Catholicism and Islam.12 
Presumably, this lowers the bar for confronting corrupt officials in countries with a “protestant” 
culture.  Furthermore, Lipset and Lenz (2000:11-12) argue that Protestantism “is more conducive 
to norm adhering behavior”, since it places more value on personal responsibility and is generally 
less tolerant towards human failing. This could make them less acceptant of corrupt behavior.  
Religion is also thought to influence how people view their loyalty to family as opposed to other 
fellow citizens. The ‘hierarchical religions’ have, at least historically, to a larger degree 
influenced societies towards ‘familism’ and thus, potentially facilitating nepotism.  
Another way in which religion could influence corruption is through the historical relationship 
between church and state. In the protestant tradition, which has its origin in opposing state 
sponsored religion, church and state got separated and this could have placed the church in a 
better position to challenge and question corrupt state officials.
13
 In the hierarchical traditions, 
however, the church and state have sometimes been so intertwined making it much harder to 
develop similar accountability-functions. This is especially the case when considering Eastern 
Christianity compared to Western Christianity. In the west a consensus emerged that the king and 
the pope rule different “spheres.” Conversely, in the east there was no clear line between the 
Orthodox Church and the ruler. According to Katchanovski (2000:64) this helped consolidate 
autocratic rule in 19
th
 century Russia.  
2.4 Theoretical Relationships  
2.4.1 Evaluating the Theories  
All of the abovementioned theories are relevant if we want to have a broad understanding on both 
the topics of corruption and historical legacies. However, some of these theories are better than 
others for guiding us towards an answer of whether levels of post-communist corruption can be 
explained by historical legacies, or not.  
First, the work by Kitschelt (2001, 1999) and Møller and Skaaning (2010) about bureaucratic 
legacies seems essential. It would, to say the least, be hard to justify not taking this variable into 
                                                 
12
 According to La Porta et al. (1996) Eastern Orthodoxy is also part of the ‘hierarchical religions.’ 
13
 However, it must be noted that in the Scandinavian countries this is not the case. Here, the protestant church and 
the state were strongly connected probably making it harder for the Scandinavian churches to question state officials.   
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account: it has clear theoretical expectations about post-communist countries, it has shown 
significant results, the data is available and the measure is applicable in a regression analysis.  
Much of the same can be said about the imperial legacy-theory. It touches most of the post-
communist countries, it has a clear expectations and it could help cast light on the same 
phenomenon as that of bureaucratic legacies. As will be seen in the analysis the strong 
correlations between these variables do not create problems with multicollinearity, thus 
potentially functioning as a robustness test of each other.  
Several theories claim that communism has created an extraordinary problem of corruption. 
Commenting on all these is not within reach for this thesis, but we have taken a closer look at the 
study by Sandholtz and Taagepera (2005). This study also seems convincing. It expects that 
communism both had structural and cultural elements that encouraged corruption, and that this 
became so embedded that it (at least culturally) lives on even after communism is gone. These 
expectations are somewhat contrary to that of bureaucratic and imperial legacies, but it is a theory 
that gives us increased insight into how the communist experience might have affected these 
countries.  
Several of the theoretical relationships identified in by the global corruption literature also seem 
relevant for our purpose. First, it is quite clear that the relationships between economic variables 
and levels of corruption should be considered. For the post-communist countries levels of 
economic development, natural resource endowments and trade openness should at least be 
included.  
Second, we must consider what theory has to say about the religious and cultural diversity in our 
cases. In particular, the effect of Protestantism or Western Christianity, which theory expects has 
a diminishing effect on corruption, should be assessed.  
There are also other theoretical relationships that could have been considered. For example the 
degree of political dissent during the communist period is expected to have effect on the 
prospects for future democracy, and the same goes for economic liberalization during the 
communist period. However, these factors seem to be secondary to those mentioned earlier, both 
in terms of expected effects and findings from earlier research. Since the theoretical framework 
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now is in place, the next step is to use these theoretical relationships to deduce concrete 
hypothesis that can be tested.  
2.4.2 Deduction of Hypotheses 
The first hypothesis deduced explores post-communist corruption in relation to global corruption 
levels.   
H1: Post-communist countries are more corrupt than other countries.  
If the theoretical expectations put forward by Sandholtz and Taagepera (2005), Karklins (2002), 
Holmes (2006) are true, corruption problems in those countries that have experiences with 
communism should be larger and more severe than those countries without this experience. Thus, 
it is expected that post-communist countries display significantly larger levels of corruption than 
other countries. As will be seen in the empirical analysis, H1 is supported by the empirical data.  
The second hypothesis postulates that a protestant heritage will lead to lower levels of corruption 
in post-communist countries: 
H2: A protestant heritage should reduce levels of post-communist corruption.  
This hypothesis is drawn from the global corruption literature, and has received substantial 
support (Treisman 2000). It predicts that if a post-communist country has/or have had some 
protestant adherents among its population this should help them achieve reduced levels of 
corruption. It will be seen in the later analysis that H2 is partially supported by the empirical data.    
Furthermore, H3 is deduced from the theory about bureaucratic legacy developed by (Kitschelt 
2001): 
H3: Differences in levels of post-communist corruption can be explained by differences in 
pre-communist bureaucratic legacies.  
H3 predicts that the variation in levels of post-communist corruption actually reflects variation in 
pre-communist bureaucratic legacies. In particular, this means that those countries with a 
bureaucratic authoritarian or a national-accommodative (value 1 and 2) bureaucratic legacy 
should have reduced levels of corruption compared to those countries with a patrimonial or 
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colonial peripheral legacy (value 3 and 4). Findings indicate that bureaucratic legacies are 
powerful predictors of post-communist corruption.   
Finally, the fourth hypothesis incorporates the effect of imperial legacy:  
H4: A Western imperial legacy should decrease levels of post-communist corruption.   
This hypothesis is deduced from the theory of Dimitrova‐Grajzl (2007), which claims that values, 
norms and practices inherited from imperial rule can explain post-communist regime outcomes. 
Thus, this hypothesis predicts that a Western imperial legacy (compared to an Ottoman or 
Russian imperial legacy) will reduce post-communist corruption. Furthermore, this variable is 
quite similar to that of bureaucratic legacies. A country’s bureaucratic legacies are to a large 
degree a product of which empire they historically were ruled by. Thus, these two variables 
measure more or less the same phenomenon, which could strengthen the robustness of these 
findings if both are significant.
14
 It is seen in the later analysis that H4 receives partial support.  
2.5 Summary 
The chapter started by defining corruption as “the misuse of public office for private gain” 
(Treisman 2007:1) It was emphasized that misuse of public office means breaching the 
impartiality principle, and that it is important to recognize the distinctive material attribute of 
private gain. Historical legacies were defined as “the structural, cultural and institutional starting 
point of ex-communist countries at the outset of the transition” (Pop‐Eleches 2007:910). Next, it 
was showed that historical legacies must be understood within the larger framework of historical 
institutionalism. In particular, the ideas of path dependency and critical junctures are critical 
‘information containers’ if we are to handle legacies as proper analytical concepts. The chapter 
proceeded with showing the remarkable diversity in corruption levels among the post-communist 
countries, and how researchers has explained this by pointing to things like pre-communist 
bureaucratic legacies, imperial legacies and the communist experience. Further, those causes of 
corruption identified by the global corruption literature were presented. Lastly, based upon the 
theoretical framework established, four hypotheses were deduced.  
                                                 
14
 However, because of the strong correlation between these two variables including them both in a statistical model 
could cause problems with multicollinearity. But, as will be seen in the analysis, the VIF indicator did not exceed the 
critical value of 10 even though both variables were included.  
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3. Methodological Considerations 
This chapter presents and defends the method and statistical models chosen to handle the data. It 
starts with explaining why a quantitative approach is better than a qualitative approach in 
answering the research question. Next, time-series cross-section design is introduced. Despite the 
analytical flexibility of TSCS data, it has its flaws. In their influential article, Beck and Katz 
(1995) provided solutions for these problems that more or less has become orthodoxy in the 
dealing with TSCS data. However, as will be shown, the ‘Beck and Katz-solution’ is not 
appropriate for the current analysis. Instead, a regression model with Prais-Winsten 
transformation (AR1) and panel-corrected standard errors seems to be the best option. In the end 
it is explained what we gain by applying TSCS design on post-communist corruption data, and 
some model specific issues are discussed.   
3.1 Introducing Times-Series Cross-Section Design 
3.1.1 Why a Quantitative Approach? 
The currents study aims to illuminate the research question by testing hypotheses containing 
expectations about the effects of historical legacies on post-communist corruption levels. In order 
to test causal hypotheses we must make causal inferences, and in order to find results valid for 
the post-communist universe we must be able to generalize. Quantitative methods are better 
suited for both these endeavors (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994:100). There are multiple 
reasons for this. 
First, and quite straightforward, quantitative research produces explanations that are 
generalizable. This is usually an unattainable (and often neglected) goal for qualitative studies. 
They usually focus on complex in-depth descriptions rather than obtaining generalizable results 
(Lancaster and Montinola 2001:4). The latter is of course a promising (and maybe even the best) 
approach when studying the effect of historical legacies in one or a few cases. However, when 
assessing the causal effect of historical legacies on post-communist corruption generally, 
quantitative methods are needed.  
Second, scholars using the qualitative methods tend to select unusual cases (outliers). This can be 
problematic since these cases are more or less unique in comparison to the general population – 
making generalization even more difficult. In the quantitative approach outliers do not represent 
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such a problem, since analyses encompass numerous cases and are able to control for the effect of 
outliers through conscious case-selection and statistical methods.  
Furthermore, quantitative methods avoid the pitfall of ‘over-determination’ (Lijphart 1971). This 
is a serious challenge to many case-oriented and ‘small-N’ studies. In practice, this often means 
that a given study has more independent variables than cases.  
Fourth, quantitative studies are better at distinguishing the relative importance of different 
independent variables. However, this usually comes at the expense of causal complexity. 
According to critics, quantitative methods risk generalizing away casual complexities that 
qualitative methods could have explained more appropriately (Ragin 1989). This is a valid point. 
However, the tradeoff is probably not so severe. Statistical methods can (to a degree) control for 
causal complexity through interaction terms and by applying a range of statistical tools
15
.  
Fifth, quantitative methods tend to be more careful when dealing with operationalization and 
measurement problems. This is because concept-validity is inherently problematic in the 
quantitative approach. Qualitative methods focus on descriptive explanations of nations, 
institutions and societies, but this is often done with lack of sensitivity to the problems of 
measurement and operationalization.  
Lastly, studies using quantitative methods are often far more replicable than qualitative studies. 
This is because they tend to give full account of the procedures used to collect and evaluate data 
(Jackman 1985). The specific quantitative method chosen for this study are the topic for the next 
section.   
3.1.2 Time-Series Cross-Section Design: Pros and Cons  
TSCS data (or panel data)
16
 has become one of the most common quantitative methods in 
political science generally, and political economy specifically (Adolph, Butler, and Wilson 2005). 
Basically, TSCS data are pooled time-series and cross-sectional data. This means that compared 
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 Like for example applying lag-structures, periodic effects and country-dummies (dynamic modeling).   
16
 The terms TSCS data and panel data are sometimes used interchangeably in the scholarly literature. There are 
however some differences. According to Beck (2001:273) TSCS data has a fixed, non-sampled number of units, 
while panel data has a shorter time-horizon and a large number of units that are randomly sampled. However, these 
differences should probably not be overrated. While TSCS data follow a hierarchical data structure, most issues 
relevant for TSCS data are relevant for panel data (Wilson and Butler 2004:2).  
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to purely cross-sectional or time-series studies, TSCS data makes it possible to capture variations 
over time and across units simultaneously
17
 (Beck and Katz 1995). This characteristic gives 
TSCS data sets analytical flexibility. First, it increases the number of observations (n) and 
therefore also the degrees of freedom in the analysis. This makes it possible to counter a problem 
that has always plagued comparative political studies: few observations and many variables 
(Lijphart 1975). Second, it makes it possible to control for exogenous shocks that potentially 
affects all countries at the same time. In addition, it is able to control for case-stable omitted 
variables, which represent an important type of unmeasured heterogeneity in multivariate 
analysis (Hargens 2004). 
Potential pitfalls 
However, TSCS data has to deal with its own problems. There are especially four issues that 
could violate the necessary assumptions for linear ordinary least squares (OLS) regression. These 
are autocorrelation, heteroskedasticity, correlated errors across units as the result of exogenous 
shocks, and a combination of the last two issues.  
Autocorrelation often occurs in time-series data because errors that are temporally close are also 
often similar to each other (Plümper, Troeger, and Manow 2005:239). This means that the errors 
are not independent of each other, and this is the case for the corruption data used in the current 
study. As we shall see later, however, there are several statistical tools available for dealing with 
autocorrelation. If autocorrelation is not dealt with it can lead to quite misleading assessments of 
the strength of the regression.  
The source of heteroskedastic errors is usually that the variance of the errors is different for 
different cases. If exogenous shocks, like for example the breakdown of the Soviet Union or the 
financial crisis, affect all countries in the analysis the result will likely be that the errors are 
correlated across countries. All of the abovementioned problems are issues that can result in 
misleading estimates and wrong standard errors (Beck and Katz 1995).  
The Beck and Katz-solution  
The standard method for solving these problems has been to use a template provided by Beck and 
Katz (1995)  (hereafter referred to as the B&K method). By including panel corrected standard 
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 Thus, TSCS data can be understood as three-dimensional, consisting of (1) cases, (2) variables, and (3) time 
points. 
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errors (PCSE) and a lagged dependent variable (LDV) at the right hand side of the regression 
equation, Beck and Katz argued that the problems of heteroskedastic errors and autocorrelation 
could be solved. In addition, they controlled for unit heterogeneity and exogenous shocks by 
incorporating fixed effects for both countries and time periods (by giving all countries and time 
periods their own constant). 
However, despite the attractiveness and widespread use of this method it should not, as several 
scholars have pointed out, be used uncritically. As both Plümper, Troeger, and Manow (2005), 
and Wilson and Butler (2007)  shows in a series of replication studies, the results of TSCS data 
are highly sensitive to simple alternative model specifications.  
Furthermore, a potential serious problem with the B&K-method is the fact that it tends to 
overlook one fundamental assumption of TSCS analysis: namely that there must exist enough 
over-time variation so that observations can meaningfully be viewed as independent. If there is 
no variation within and between variables, TSCS data will not provide increased degrees of 
freedom. This is because the number of observations is only artificially increased (in the same 
way as one could divide a variable in weeks instead of years (Wilson and Butler 2007:108). As 
will be shown in the next chapter the nature of the variables used in this analysis are mostly time-
invariant or at least slow-changing (quite obviously since they try to capture historical legacies), 
and this poses some interesting challenges for a sound application of TSCS analysis. However, 
even though the variables mostly lack “within”-variation they have variation between cases, 
which makes the B&K-method less appropriate.  
Why the B&K-method is unsuitable for the current analysis 
First, and most importantly, a direct consequence of using fixed effects (FE) is that the potential 
effects of time-invariant variables are excluded. This is of course incompatible with both the 
theoretical and empirical design of this thesis. Historical legacies are by their very nature 
(relatively) stable country-traits that, in the current context, are thought to influence the level of 
corruption.  
The fact that FE-models is unsuitable for estimating time-invariant or slow-changing (“sluggish”) 
variables is quite recognized in the literature. According to Beck, “the fixed effects will soak up 
most of the explanatory power of those slowly changing variables (…) [and] make it hard for 
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such variables to appear either substantively or statistically significant” (2001:285). In addition, 
estimates will also potentially be misleading because of the methods inefficiency for handling 
time-invariant variables (Plümper and Troeger 2007:127).  
Second, as soon as the dependent variable starts to show some variance, FE-models will soak up 
any variation that occurred before the starting point of the analysis. This is because FE-models 
completely remove cross-level effects. Theoretically speaking, this is an assumption that fits 
badly with the current analysis. It is the cross-case differences and not over-time differences that 
are of primary importance in this study. Hence, taking the abovementioned issues into account, 
applying fixed effects in the current analysis is problematic.   
Alternatively, one could use random effects (RE) models. However, when the independent 
variables are correlated with the unit effects, RE-models will produce both inconsistent and 
unbalanced results (Stock and Watson 2012:647-649, Plümper and Troeger 2007). Another 
alternative is to apply the Hausman-Taylor method (a common method in econometrics), where 
instrumental variables are included in order to correct for the skewedness in the RE-model. This 
opportunity seems, nevertheless, to be quite unrealistic for researchers that are concerned with 
empirical assessment and not just statistical modeling
18
 (Plümper and Troeger 2011:149).  
3.2 The TSCS Design in the Current Analysis 
There are two potential solutions to the problems described above. The first one is to use OLS 
with panel-corrected standard errors (PCSE) to correct for panel heteroskedasticity and a Prais-
Winsten transformation (AR) to correct for autocorrelation (hereafter PW-model or PW-
regression).  
3.2.1 Prais-Winsten regression 
In the PW-model an autoregressive (AR) transformation is applied in order to lag the residual. 
The purpose of this is to obtain more efficient estimates and eliminate autocorrelation (Stock and 
Watson 2012:644). The B&K-method, however, advocates using a lagged dependent variable 
(LDV) instead. Several scholars have pointed out that to use a LDV to explain a potential trend in 
the data is problematic. For example, as Plümper et.al. shows, a LDV treats the dynamics of all 
independent variables as identical since it introduces (and measures) a weighted average of the 
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 To elaborate a bit, it seems like studies with a high concern for validity seldom has powerful instrumentals at their 
disposal.  
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independent variables at the right-hand side of the regression equation. As they emphasize in 
their article, “this assumption is not very convincing and almost certainly wrong” (Plümper, 
Troeger, and Manow 2005:335). In addition, it cannot be used with RE- or FE-models. This is 
not the case with the PW-method.  
One of the advantages with PW-models is that they are less sensitive to time-series dynamics 
compared to the B&K-method. Therefore, it is a better method if the goal is to explain not only 
cross-sectional variance but also average changes in levels, as is the case with this study.  
Thus, this thesis uses the PW-model as the basic model in the analysis.
 19
  An apparent weakness 
with these models is that they risk explaining the variance in the dependent variable that existed 
prior to 1998, with the variance in the mean of the independent variables in the period between 
1998 and 2012. As a result, we must assume that countries with comparably high rates of 
corruption in the period between 1998 and 2012 also had the highest levels prior to 1998. In 
addition, PW-models fail to control for the effect of omitted variables (Plümper, Troeger, and 
Manow 2005:332).   
3.2.3 Defending its Use on Post-Communist Corruption Data 
Overcoming “small-n” 
One potential problem when trying to carry out a multivariate statistical analysis on post-
communist countries is the limited number of cases (around 30). However, TSCS data is able to 
handle this problem by collecting data on the cases at several points in time rather than just one. 
This makes it possible to obtain additional observations, which facilitates a better analysis.  Thus, 
instead of having between 24 and 29 observations per model, the models in this thesis have 
between 299 and 340 observations. Despite the potential serious problems with making over-time 
comparisons using corruption data (this will be further addressed in the next chapter), increasing 
the observations strengthen our ability to produce valid statistical inferences.  
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 It is important to remember that the goal of this, or any other statistical model, is to be a useful representation of 
reality, and not a true representation of reality. However, even though a model cannot aspire to be the “truth,” it can 
be used successfully to explore the relationships between variables and make sound forecasts based on those 
relationships.  Furthermore, these models are only temporary constructions and should change as a result of new 
data, alternative models, analysis of the current model etc. In addition, there are typically several different models 
that are useful representations of reality.   
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Dealing with autocorrelation 
As noted in section 3.1.2, an important assumption of the regression analysis is that the random 
errors are uncorrelated with each other. However, when the data has a natural sequential order, as 
is the case with perceived corruption levels, the result is that the correlation structure is related to 
the sequential order of the data. This means that, empirically, one of the biggest challenges in 
estimating determinants of post-communist corruption is special and serial autocorrelations 
because corruption levels in one year is likely influenced by corruption level in the previous year. 
There are several reasons for why autocorrelation occurs. In TSCS data (or time-series data) it is 
often the case that adjacent values are similar which means that, often, high values follow high 
values and low values follow low values. For example, in economic data, measurements from 
consecutive time periods (like days, months, years) are often positively correlated because of 
over-time changes in underlying economic processes (Chatterjee and Simonoff 2013:82). 
Autocorrelation can also occur by the fact that an important explanatory variable has been 
omitted from the model. Usually, this happens because the successive values of the omitted 
variable are correlated, which means that the errors of the model will reflect the effect of the 
missing variable. Hence, it is important not to misinterpret what really is an issue of model 
specification for autocorrelation.  
3.3 Summary  
This chapter has presented the method and models used to handling data, on which hypotheses 
are tested. The strength of the quantitative approach in comparison to the qualitative approach is 
that it can produce explanations that are generalizable; it is better equipped for making causal 
inferences; it has a more conscious approach to operationalization and measurement; and it is 
easier to replicate quantitative studies. All this makes quantitative analysis better suited for 
answering the research question. However, the TSCS design, despite its inherent flexibility, often 
struggles with autocorrelation, heteroskedasticity, correlated errors across units and 
heteroskedastic errors. As shown, the solution proposed by Beck and Katz (1995) for solving 
these problems cannot, for several reasons, be applied in this analysis. The most important factor 
is that, by using fixed effects, the potential effect of time-invariant variables is excluded. This 
would be disastrous for the current analysis. A Prais-Winsten transformed regression model with 
panel-corrected standard errors is, as argued in the text, better suited for the current analysis. It 
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effectively deals with autocorrelation and is less sensitive to time-series dynamics. The latter 
point is important because this analysis is not primarily concerned with over-time variation but 
between-unit variation. Lastly, TSCS data overcomes the “small-n” problem that is characteristic 
for post-communist studies.  The next chapter deals with the particular data (and related issues) 
that the abovementioned methodology will be applied upon.   
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4. Case Selection, Data and Operationalization  
This section starts by briefly explaining the case-selection and time-period applied in this 
analysis. Then, the data and sources underlying the dependent variables will be examined, with a 
thorough discussion of the quality of corruption data. The chapter ends with an examination of 
the data underlying the independent variables. In addition the chapter contains summary statistics 
of all variables.  
4.1 Case Selection and Time Period 
4.1.1 The Post-Communist Countries 
The selection of cases for this thesis is naturally limited by its focus on the post-communist 
world. This means that we do not need to have a long argument about why the particular cases 
are selected: the cases for this analysis are more or less given. This means that the following 
countries are included in the analysis: Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia-
Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Georgia, Hungary, Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Moldova, Mongolia, Montenegro, Poland, Romania, 
Russia, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan.  
As shown in the descriptive statistics in chapter two, the between-country variation on the 
dependent variable amongst the post-communist country is quite large. This variation is positive 
when, in chapter five, we want to draw statistical inferences.  
One of the challenges with choosing countries on the sole basis of region is that they often 
display little variation on the dependent variable in order to be assessed properly. However, the 
post-communist “region” is marked by distinct variation on many variables. In addition, it is 
inherently problematic to treat the post-communist world as one region in the same way as 
Western Europe or Latin America. Echoing the arguments put forward in chapter two, the post-
communist “region” actually consists of three regions: Central/East-Europe, South-Eastern 
Europe and Central Asia.  
4.1.2 The Time Period: 1996-2011  
Data availability on the dependent variables limits the time period under assessment to be 
between 1996 and 2011.  The independent variables all originate before this (since they measure 
historical legacies). Some are from the outset of the transition, some are from the ends of the 
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communist period and many are from the pre-communist period. Even though this thesis is 
mainly concerned with between-country variation, and not over-times variation, the chosen time-
span gives us flexibility in terms of larger-n and gives us more certainty when making statistical 
inferences.  
4.2 Data and Operationalization 
4.2.1 Dependent Variables: Data on Corruption Levels 
The data on corruption levels that will be used in the empirical analysis are gathered from three 
different sources: (1) Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index (TI), (2) Control 
of Corruption Index from the World Bank (WB) and Nations in Transit’s (NiT) measure of 
corruption. By combining these three measures we will be able to perform a robust test of the 
hypotheses.   
The TI is an index of perceived corruption and is probably the most commonly used index in 
empirical quantitative analysis. To generate this index Transparency International draw from a 
number of different sources that include country risk ratings produced by consultancies, surveys 
of business people and polls of country inhabitants. Most of these are based on expert 
evaluations. 13 sources from 12 independent institutions (one is NiT) are included in the CPI 13. 
The TI has a fairly good coverage of the post-communist countries, but it is not as extensive as 
the WB index because TI requires data from all the different sources if a country is to be included 
(WB treats one source as sufficient). The TI includes annual ratings dating back to 1995.
20
  
The WB is also an index of perceived levels of corruption, and like the TI they aggregate 
information from multiple sources. From 1996 to 2002 they published their country ratings every 
second year, but since then findings have been published annually.  The index originally ranges 
from -2.5 to +2.5 but has in this study been rescaled to 0 to 10.   
The third corruption indicator is NiT. NiT exclusively focuses on the post-communist countries 
and has since 1995 surveyed the political developments in these countries. Their corruption 
variable, however, was introduced in 1999. The index is based on expert assessments covering 
issues like public perceptions of corruption, the business interests of high ranking policy makers, 
laws on financial disclosure and conflict of interest, and the effectiveness of anti-corruption work. 
                                                 
20
 I were, however, only able to obtain data from 1996 and onwards.  
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NiT’s index have many similarities with the well-known freedom house indexes of civil liberties 
and political rights. Political development is measured on a scale where 1 represents the highest 
and 7 the lowest level of democratic progress. This procedure is similar for all the seven sub-
categories (national democratic governance, electoral process, civil society, independent media, 
local democratic governance, judicial framework and corruption).  
Even though these three measures draw from different sources and apply different methodology, 
they are strongly correlated, as can be seen in Table 3 below.  
Table 3: Correlations between dependent variables (2010) 
 TI WB NiT 
TI 1 
N=29 
  
WB .980*** 
N=29 
1 
N=29 
 
NiT .942*** 
N=28 
.972*** 
N=28 
1 
N=28 
 
The main reason for using three indicators of corruption levels is to achieve a sufficient level of 
validity and reliability (Adcock and Collier 2001). The most common approach in the corruption 
literature has been to use only one dependent variable (usually TI). Instead, by applying three 
different measures of the dependent variable we will be better equipped for a more robust test of 
the hypotheses. The three indicators are all standardized to a scale ranging from 0 (clean) to 10 
(most corrupt).  
Table 4: Summary statistics of dependent variables  
Variable Obs. Mean Std. dev. Min Max 
Transparency International 
CPI (0-10) 
388 6.51 1.25 3.30 8.70 
World Bank Control of 
Corruption (0-10) 
363 5.72 1.27 2.37 7.99 
Nations in Transit (0-10) 378 6.33 2.26 1.66 9.58 
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4.2.2 Corruption and Measurement: The Quality of the Data (REF) 
Despite the fact that the TI, WB and NiT data (in addition to some other measures) are now being 
widely used in corruption research, their reliability has been criticized. Two issues have 
particularly been raised.  
Potential dangers: Perception-based measurement and aggregation of sources  
First, the data measures perceptions about the prevalence of corruption and not the extent of 
corruption per se. The measures are based on expert assessments and survey respondents, which 
is why they sometimes are referred to as “subjective” indexes. However, such opinions do not 
need to be based on any direct knowledge of the phenomenon in order to be reported, and the 
results could therefore be biased.  
Instead of reflecting the prevalence of corruption, these perceptions could reflect cross-national 
differences in the perceived social or economic injustice in a society, the degree of public 
identification with the government, how the media portrays the phenomenon, the effectiveness of 
anti-corruption campaigns, Western values and preconceptions and ideological biases (Treisman 
2007:215). Put differently, perceived corruption may reflect other things than the phenomenon 
itself. If researchers use these data to make definitive arguments about the relationship between, 
say democracy and corruption, it is troublesome.  In other words, confusing perceptions about 
corruption with corruption itself would be a grave mistake. 
Second, questions have been raised concerning how these indexes aggregate their sources. The 
argument is that the individual sources used to construct each index are measuring different 
things, and therefore their aggregation is problematic (Treisman 2007:215). The sources consist 
of opinions by Western experts, polls of international business people or country inhabitants, and 
surveys that ask questions about the relative nature of the corruption problem and its frequency. 
They also differ in focus, whereas some emphasize “petty” corruption (low-level administrative 
corruption), and others focus on more large-scale political corruption. In addition, some have a 
regional coverage while others are global in scope.  
Consequently, one could wonder what the aggregate of these sources really is measuring. A 
possible solution could be to use specific parts of these sources and matching them with the 
specific problem it addresses, which could make more sense than using an index. However, 
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because of cultural and societal differences in perceptions of corruption, similar questions to the 
same target group in different countries would, nonetheless, be interpreted differently. What a 
businessman in Poland thinks is “misuse” of public office for private gain probably differs from 
what a businessman in Turkmenistan thinks constitutes the same phenomenon. So, basically, 
there exist concerns about both the comparability of sources and the comparability of cross-
country survey responses.
21
     
Possible solutions 
Scholars have responded to the abovementioned issues in several ways. First, it is clear that there 
exist limited alternatives to the subjective indexes when it comes to reliable cross-country 
sources. Should one stop to study a phenomenon that most people think is an important topic only 
because the measures are imperfect? Of course, one could study corruption by using judicial 
material (i.e. rates of prosecution, conviction of misuse of office), but these sources are also in 
danger of capturing things that are besides the phenomenon itself (i.e. the competence of the 
police and judiciary, the priority of anti-corruption work and measures).  
An alternative could be to use proxies to measure corruption, and some researches have tried this 
approach. For example, Golden and Picci (2005) studied regional corruption in Italy by creating 
an index based on a comparison of the value of existing infrastructure stocks to past infrastructure 
spending. However, using such an approach across countries would be difficult, if not impossible.  
Despite the lack of real alternatives to the perception-based measures there has in recent time 
been a positive development when it comes to some experienced-based measures. Especially 
Transparency International’s Global Corruption Barometer (GCB) and the United Nations 
Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI) have come up with some promising 
results. They ask their respondents (or their family members’ or their firm’s) about their personal 
experience with corruption. The positive aspects of these measures are that they are less prone to 
capture perception-biases (inferences influenced by impressions, prejudices, rumors etc.) since 
they rely on actual experiences. On the other hand, such data also faces difficulties because of 
things like unclear memories, fear of reprisals from the government etc.  
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 Several cross-national surveys carefully construct their questions to strengthen the reliability of the answers and 
avoid misunderstandings.      
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A second response to the concerns about using data on perceived corruption has been to view the 
variety of sources as a positive sign. The fact that the indexes measuring perceived corruption are 
strongly correlated – despite their differences in methodology, sources and definitions – could 
indicate that they are capturing the same phenomenon. In TI’s 2005 CPI the average correlation 
amongst the sources was r = 0.87 (Lambsdorff 2005).  
If experience-based corruption measures are an alternative to the perception-based ratings, an 
interesting question is to find out how strongly they correlate. Razafindrakoto and Roubaud 
(2005) conducted a study in eight African countries where they compared survey results from 
inhabitant’s experience with corruption, with answers from experts of what they thought the 
inhabitants would report. The results showed that the experts overestimated the level of 
corruption in every single country. On average, the experts believed that 54 per cent of the 
population had experienced acts of corruption in the last year, while the survey results only 
showed 13 per cent (Razafindrakoto and Roubaud 2005:292).  
Furthermore, there was no correlation between the expected corruption levels and the reported 
corruption levels among any of the eight countries. The expert assessments were, however, 
correlated at 0.65 with the WB index (Treisman 2007:217), which could mean that experts share 
a common view about the cross-national prevalence of corruption that is, nonetheless, 
disturbingly different from what ordinary people experience.  
That being said, there have also been found a mismatch between opinions and actual experience 
of corruption among country-residents themselves. Survey responses on questions like how 
corruption affects politics, business and personal life in their country did not correlate strongly 
(around 0.20) with questions whether anyone in the household had paid a bribe in the last year. 
Actually, their answers correlated more closely with the WB index than with their reported 
experience of corruption (Treisman 2007:219). In other words, expert assessments are not the 
only opinions who seems to differ from actual experience.  
This influences how we are to understand research findings. A possible conclusion of the 
abovementioned issues is that perception-based corruption indexes fails to capture the frequency 
of corrupt behavior in a reliable manner. However, even if this became the conclusion, there 
would still be reasons to study perceived corruption because perceptions can have a powerful 
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impact on reality. Studies have found that perceived levels of corruption discourages victims 
from reporting crimes to the police (Soares 2004) and reduces economic growth via its effect on 
investments (Mauro 1995). What these studies would have found if the perceptions were believed 
to be false is, on the other hand, not clear. That being said, it still seems like the subjective 
indexes are the best tool available for assessing the cross-national frequency of corrupt behavior 
today. 
Corruption data in time-series analysis 
One last question, which is of high relevance for this study, is about the use of perception data in 
longitudinal analysis. Several studies have, in the same way as the current analysis, put annual 
perceived corruption scores into a TSCS panel for analysis. According to Treisman (2007:220), 
however, this is not recommended. There are three reasons for this.  
First, the methodology for constructing some of the indexes (especially TI’s CPI index) has not 
been consistent over the years, meaning that the index ratings could have changed independently 
of changes in perception levels. Furthermore, TI and WB have changed sources used in 
successive years with the consequence of reporting changes in perception levels that are the result 
of new data rather than real changes in perception levels. Thirdly, the TI index has sometimes 
operated with reduced interyear variation because of the occasional reusing of the same surveys 
in successive years. In addition, some perceptions levels are changed between successive years 
with the intention of correcting ratings that later have been regarded as wrong (Lambsdorff 
2005:4)  
As a result, both the TI and WB teams emphasize that only large interyear changes can be taken 
seriously. Furthermore, so much as half of the over-time variance in the WB index could result 
from changes in the sources used and the different weighting of these sources (Kaufmann and 
Kraay 2002:13-14). On the other hand, Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2006) believe that 
some longer over-time changes are large enough to be significant.
22
  
All this forces researchers to handle findings derived from perception-based indexes with 
extreme caution, especially inferences drawn from over-time analysis. However, if variations in 
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 They compared results from 1996 and 2004, and found that changes in 5-7 per cent of the countries were 
significant. Perception levels increased in Zimbabwe, Cyprus, Israel and Moldova, and it decreased in Latvia, 
Estonia, the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain.  
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the between-year ratings can be traced back to changes in individual sources (and not from 
methodological or technical changes), over-time trends can, according to Sampford (2006:84), 
cautiously be identified.  
Obviously, to run such a “background check” on all inter-year changes in the relevant time period 
is outside the scope of this thesis, but it should ideally have been done in order to assess the 
reliability of the findings. The current study confines itself to cautiously interpreting findings 
(especially over-time changes) and being open with the obvious shortcomings of the data. As 
argued above, even though the subjective indexes are flawed when it comes to over-time 
comparisons, they are from the author’s point of view the best measures available.   
4.2.3 Independent Variables and Controls: Historical Legacies 
This last section of chapter four explains the operationalization of controls and independent 
variables that will be assessed in the coming analysis. However, that analysis (chapter five) will 
show that several relevant variables included in this section had to be excluded from the final 
models, due to multicollinearity problems. An overview over sources and summary statistics is 
can be found at the end.  
Cultural/Religious Legacies 
As we have seen cultural/religious legacies have been highlighted as important factors explaining 
political outcomes in the Eastern European/Post-communist context (Pop‐Eleches 2007, Janos 
1989).  The cultural/religious measures identified as relevant in this study are protestant heritage, 
minorities, Muslim and Imperial legacy.  
Protestant heritage is measured by the percent of protestant adherents in 1980, and it is meant to 
capture the potential positive effect of protestant values, traditions and mindsets on post-
communist levels of corruption. A possible danger with this variable is the small amount of 
protestants in post-communist countries (only Estonia had/have a protestant majority, and several 
countries have no protestant adherents at all), which could lead to wrong estimates. It is derived 
from the Standard Quality of Government dataset  (Teorell et al. 2013 which uses , La Porta et al. 
1999).  
To measure minorities I use the data provided by Katchanovski (2000). Here, minorities are 
measured as percentage of population in 1989. There is no direct theoretical link in the literature 
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between minorities and corruption. However, the variable is included as a control since ethnic 
fractionalization is a feature in several post-communist countries (especially in the Balkans) and 
this could have an effect on levels of corruption (See Roeder 1999).  
Muslim is also a control variable, and it is a dummy for whether a country had a Muslim majority 
in 1990 or not. Several scholars argue that Islam has a negative effect on democratic performance 
(Fish 2002, Stepan and Robertson 2003) , but this relationship has not been so clear when it 
comes to corruption. However, amongst the most corrupt post-communist countries all have a 
Muslim majority. Therefore, it is important to control for this cultural factors. The data are 
gathered from the CIA World Factbook.  
Imperial legacy is the second independent variable and is coded with three values: (0) a 
Russian/Ottoman imperial legacy, (1) a mixed imperial legacy and (2) a Western imperial legacy. 
The variable to a large degree follows Dimitrova‐Grajzl (2007), but I also include a category for 
mixed imperial legacy since several of today’s countries historically (i.e. Poland) were divided 
between different empires.  
Economic Legacies 
Given the particular nature of plan economies and the painful post-communist economic 
adjustment, economic legacies probably represent powerful constraints on post-communist 
outcomes, which include levels of corruption. The measures are: energy intensity, resource 
endowments and trade dependence.  
Energy intensity is supposed to capture structural economic distortions originating in the 
communist period. It is operationalized by using the inverse of GDP per unit of commercial 
energy use, normalized for the share of industrial output in total GDP (Pop‐Eleches 2007:912). 
The data are gathered from World Development Indicators (2001).  
As mentioned in chapter two several scholars argue that natural resource wealth can create a 
“resource curse” that increased levels of corruption. To control for this possibility I have included 
a variable for resource endowments. The measure is based on De Melo et al. (2001) and countries 
are coded as either rich, moderate or poor.  
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Trade dependence tries to capture the fact that some communist countries were more dependent 
on intra-communist trade than others. Those who were less dependent naturally had the potential 
to trade more with the West and thus be exposed to anti-corruption values. The data is derived 
from De Melo et al. (2001) and it is measured as the ratio of CMEA exports and imports to GDP 
(in %) in 1990.  
Social Conditions/Modernization 
At the outset of the transition the post-communist countries were marked by substantial 
differences when it came to social conditions and modernization. Interestingly, this was the case 
despite the communist’s intense efforts to erase large pre-communist differences. According to 
the modernization theory such differences should help predict the readiness for democracy. Thus, 
since democracy is inimical to corruption, it is likely that these levels also effects post-communist 
corruption. The current analysis focuses on GDP/capita 1989, Urbanization and Higher 
education. The data for GDP/capita 1989 and Urbanization are gathered from De Melo et al. 
(2001), and higher education are derived from UNICEF (2005).  
Institutional Legacies 
Even though the post-communist countries had a common history of communist one-party rule, 
they exhibited substantial institutional differences, many which could be traced to the pre-
communist past. Bureaucratic legacy has already been mentioned as an important variable. The 
data for this measure is derived from Møller and Skaaning (2010) who bases their classification 
upon Kitschelt (2001). The other variables are history of statehood, prior democracy and pre-war 
membership in the Soviet Union.  
The statehood variable is supposed to control for possible effects of having historical experience 
with the multiple tasks of running a state. An early settlement of statehood probably increases the 
power of the state apparatus, and could thus function as an inhibiting factor against corruption
23
. 
Presumably, a strong state is more able to implement laws, enforce sanctions and control its 
bureaucrats. This variable consists of three values: (1) countries with experience of independent 
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 See Pop‐Eleches (2007) and Wittenberg (2006) for links between statehood experience and post-communist 
democracy. Arguably, several of this links are also relevant for post-communist corruption.  
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statehood after the First World War;
24
 (2) countries with experience as part of decentralized 
states;
25
 and (3) countries that became new nation states in 1989.
26
 
Table 5: Overview of independent and control variables 
 Variable name Coding/measurement Source(s) 
C
u
ltu
ra
l/R
elig
io
u
s 
L
eg
a
cies 
Protestant heritage Percentage of protestant adherents in 1980 Teorell et al. (2013) using 
La Porta et al. (1999) 
Muslim Muslim majority? 1 = yes, 0 = no Author using CIA World 
Factbook 
Minorities Proportion of ethnic minorities (in %) Katchanovski (2000) 
Imperial legacy 2 = western, 1 = mixed , 0 = Ottoman or Russian Author using Dimitrova‐
Grajzl (2007) 
    
E
co
n
o
m
ic L
eg
a
cies 
Energy intensity (GDP per unit)
-1
/(% industry/total GDP) Author using Pop‐Eleches 
(2007) and World 
Development Indicators 
(2001) 
Resource 
endowments 
2 = rich, 1 = moderate, 0 = poor De Melo et al. (2001) 
Trade dependence Non-CMEA exports/Total exports De Melo et al. (2001) 
    
S
o
cia
l 
C
o
n
d
itio
n
s/M
o
d
ern
iza
tio
n
 
GDP/capita 1989 GDP/capita in 1989 at PPP De Melo et al. (2001) 
% Urban 1989 Urban population /total (in %) De Melo et al. (2001) 
% Higher education 
1989 
% higher education enrollment in 19-24 age group UNICEF (2005) 
    
In
stitu
tio
n
a
l L
eg
a
cies 
Bureaucratic legacy Bureaucratic-authoritarian = 1, national-
accommodative = 2, patrimonial = 3, colonial 
periphery = 4. 
Møller and Skaaning (2010) 
using Kitschelt (2001). 
History of statehood 2 = experience of independent statehood after WW1, 
1 = part of decentralized states, 0 = new nation states 
Author using CIA World 
Factbook 
Prior democracy Years of interwar democratic experience Author using Cheibub, 
Gandhi, and Vreeland 
(2010) 
Pre-war Soviet 
Republic 
1 = yes, 0 = no Author 
                                                 
24
 Albania, Bulgaria, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Mongolia, Poland, Romania.  
25
 Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Czech Republic, Kazakhstan, Macedonia, Montenegro, Russia,  
26
 Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan.  
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Next, the prior democracy variable is based on much of the same mechanism as the statehood 
variable: democratic experience probably strengthens today’s democracy and thus could have 
inhibiting effects on corruption. The data consist of number of democratic years in the interwar 
period and are derived from Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland (2010).  
Lastly, prewar Soviet republic is thought to capture the fact that communism probably left a 
deeper footprint in some post-communist countries thon others.  
Table 6: Summary statistics of independent and control variables 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. dev. Min Max 
Minorities 466 23.93 16.03 0 60 
Protestant heritage 483 4.90 12.74 0 66 
Muslim 473 .34 .47 0 1 
Imperial legacy 473 .39 .67 0 2 
Energy intensity 391 18.34 9.01 6.36 39.92 
Resource endowments 408 .46 .70 0 2 
Trade dependence 442 20.70 12.02 3.70 41 
GDP/cap. 1989 (log) 442 8.40 .36 7.65 9.14 
% Urban 1989 442 56.73 11.24 32.4 73.6 
% Higher education 1989 449 17.76 7.20 6.9 36.1 
Bureaucratic legacy 473 2.96 .948 1 4 
History of statehood 473 .96 .82 0 2 
Prior democracy 473 1.35 2.25 0 7 
Pre-war Soviet Republic 483 .39 .49 0 1 
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4.3 Summary  
We have now seen that the observations in the analysis are 29 post-communist countries in the 
time-period between 1996 and 2011. Since this study is concerned with post-communist 
corruption the selection of cases is given. Corruption data are gathered from three different 
sources: (1) Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index, (2) World Bank Control 
of Corruption Indicator and (3) Nations in Transit. By applying three measures of corruption that 
all uses different sources and methodologies (but still are strongly correlated), we are able to 
conduct a more robust test of the hypotheses than if we only used one or two measures. However, 
two problems are acute when using these data: (1) they measure perceptions of corruption and 
not actual corrupt acts, and (2), because of methodological inconsistency, they are not well suited 
for over-time comparisons. As seen in the chapter, data on the independent variable are drawn 
from a variety of sources. By explaining issues of case selection, data and measurement, this 
chapter has given us the empirical inputs needed to test the hypotheses identified in chapter two. 
This is where we now turn.  
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5. Results: Empirical Analysis and Discussion 
In this chapter the results of the hypotheses tests are presented. First, by using average corruption 
scores on post-communist countries in relation to other countries and an OLS regression on a 
global set of countries, H1 are tested. The findings indicate that post-communist countries 
actually are more corrupt than other countries, thus giving support for H1. At first sight this could 
be seen as a direct consequence of the communist experience, but as will be shown, this may not 
be the case.  
Next, the link between historical legacies and corruption are explored a bit further. Many legacy 
variables display significant correlations with corruption levels, and a simple OLS regression that 
includes only a few of these variables illustrate the explanatory power of historical legacies in 
relation to post-communist corruption.  
Further, H2, H3 and H4 are tested using a Prais-Winsten regression model with panel-corrected 
standard errors. The findings are as follows. H2 is supported by the data across all three 
measures, even when excluding the case of Estonia, which is the only country with a protestant 
majority and thus could be suspected to drive the results. However, because the effect of a 
protestant heritage is so small across all models, H2 is only partially strengthened. H3 receives 
the strongest support of all hypotheses. It is consistently significant across measures and is the 
variable that displays the strongest effect. Transforming the bureaucratic legacy variable into a 
dummy for “unfavorable” bureaucratic legacy only strengthened the results. An interesting 
observation when testing H4 is its failure to obtain any significance when using the TI measure, 
while it achieves significant results when using both the WB and NiT measures. Because of its 
lack of significance with the TI measure, H4 is also only partially strengthened.  
The last section tests the standard battery of legacy variables against a series of relevant 
proximate explanations. Here, a prospect of joining the EU is the variable with the strongest 
results. However, the overall picture is evident: historical legacies are remarkably stable 
predictors of post-communist corruption even when tested against relevant alternative 
explanations.  
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5.1 Hypotheses Tests 
5.1.1 Testing Hypothesis One: Are Post-Communist Countries Particularly Corrupt? 
Can the communist experience account for any of the cross-country variation in levels of 
corruption? Scholars argue, that because of their unique experience with Leninism, post-
communist countries face an extraordinary problem with corruption compared to non-communist 
countries (Holmes 2006, Karklins 2005, Sandholtz and Taagepera 2005, Karklins 2002, Miller, 
Grødeland, and Koshechkina 2001). This “uniqueness hypothesis” is based on several related 
arguments (See Linde 2009).  
First, the old communist regimes were characterized by political, social and economic 
monopolies that made it possible for corruption to flourish. In the words of Robert Klitgaard 
(1988:75), corruption constitutes “monopoly + discretion – accountability.” Second, it has been 
argued that, over time, the corrupt practices of the communist era became embedded in culture, 
and thus its consequences lives on after the transition (Sandholtz and Taagepera 2005). Third, the 
vacuum followed by the collapse of communism and the subsequent privatization created vast 
opportunities for corruption. The rules of the economy and the state had to be rewritten, and those 
in power could write these rules to benefit themselves (Vachudova 2009:44).  
Table 4 presents the average scores of perceived corruption for post-communist countries and 
other countries. The scores are calculated from the 1999 and 2008 reports from Transparency 
International and the 1998 and 2008 versions of the World Bank’s “Control of Corruption” index.  
Table 7: Average corruption scores in post-communist and non-post-communist countries 
 TI 1999 TI 2008 WB 1998 WB 2008 
Post-Communist 6.74 6.47 5.75 5.68 
Other Countries 4.98 5.93 4.97 5.02 
Difference of means 1.75*** 0.54* 0.78** 0.65** 
N (post-communist) 73 (25) 148 (29) 158 (27) 162 (29) 
Note: Differences of means significant at *** p<.01 ** p<.05 * p<.10 (equal variances not assumed).  
At first sight, the data indicates that post-communist countries do have more corrupt governments 
than other countries. The post-communist countries display significantly higher average levels of 
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corruption in all four columns, although the difference diminishes over time. Despite these 
significant results, however, it is important to ask whether the difference is caused by other 
factors than the post-communist status alone.   
Table 5 presents three OLS regressions of the TI CPI index on a dummy for post-communist with 
one year lagged controls for economic and democratic development.  
Table 8: Corruption (TI 2005) and communist legacy   
 (1) 
TI 2005 
(2) 
TI 2005 
(3) 
TI 2005 
(4) 
TI 2005 
(5) 
TI 2005 
Post-Communist 0.960** 
(.446) 
1.21*** 
(.286) 
1.258*** 
(.284) 
  
Log GDP per/cap (1-year 
lag) 
 -1.22*** 
(.080) 
-1.150*** 
(.084) 
-1.180*** 
(.089) 
-1.151*** 
(.087) 
Democracy (1-year lag)   -.517** 
(.233) 
-.428* 
(.257) 
-.535** 
(.245) 
Non-Soviet Post-
Communist 
   1.397*** 
(.440) 
 
Post-Soviet      1.179*** 
(.375) 
Constant 5.768*** 
(.188) 
16.219*** 
(.697) 
15.914*** 
(.701) 
16.126*** 
(.735) 
15.938*** 
(.727) 
N 157 155 155 140 144 
R
2 
.023 .61 .62 .61 .62 
Note: Entries are unstandardized OLS regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. *** p<.01, ** 
p<.05, * p<.10.  
Model 1 shows that, without any controls, post-communist countries were on average 0.96 points 
more corrupt than other countries on the 10-point scale in 2005. When economic development is 
introduced as a control in model 2 the post-communist effect actually becomes stronger. In model 
three a control for democratic development is included, and it further increases the explanatory 
power of the communist experience.  
One reasonable objection to the results in the three first models is that the estimates for the post-
communist dummy are driven by the post-soviet states. Such a view can be defended theoretically 
since communism probably left a deeper footprint in the countries incorporated into the Soviet 
Union.  
According to model 4 and 5, however, there is no significant distinction between the countries 
that were and were not a part of the USSR: non-Soviet post-communism still has a significantly 
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negative effect on perceived corruption levels – and the same goes for the post-soviet countries. 
The coefficient for the Non-Soviet dummy is significant at the 99 percent level and display a 
similar effect as both the post-soviet dummy in model 5 and the post-communist dummy in 
model 2 and 3.  
Thus, it seems plausible to argue that the significantly higher levels of corruption in post-
communist countries are caused, at least in part, by its communist experience. The data seems to 
support the “uniqueness hypothesis”, and suggests that corruption in post-communist countries 
cannot be explained away with reference either to lack of democratic performance nor economic 
under-development.
27
  Hence, H1 seems to be strengthened.  
Before testing the other hypotheses it is useful to explore the link between legacies and 
corruption a bit further. In the following, we will first look at correlations between different 
legacies indicators and secondly, a basic cross-sectional OLS regression will be presented with 
the purpose of illustrating the explanatory power of legacies.  
5.1.2 Exploring the Legacy-Corruption Link  
Although the post-communist countries shared a similar past as Leninist one-party states their 
development after the transition, as we have seen, took dramatically different courses. This 
indicates that post-communist development has been, and probably still is, deeply embedded in 
historically rooted differences (Pop‐Eleches 2007). The high and statistically significant 
correlations between different legacies and corruption scores observed in Table 6 below seem to 
confirm this.  
According to the data the legacy clusters of culture and institutions appear to be the strongest 
correlates of corruption. The two variables representing religion, Protestant heritage and Muslim, 
are significant predictors in the culture/religion cluster and both operate in the hypothesized 
direction. A protestant heritage seems to be associated with lower levels of corruption, while 
countries that are predominantly Muslim seems to be plagued by more corruption. Imperial 
legacy also displays significant and relatively strong correlates with corruption. Not surprisingly, 
countries that historically were under Russian or Ottoman lordship seem to have more corruption 
                                                 
27
 The regressions were also, as a basic robustness check, conducted with the WB and NiT measures as the 
dependent variable. In contrast to the results displayed above the post-communist dummy was not significant in 
model 1 using the WB data. However, the overall results were consistent with those in table 5.  
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today than those countries that were under Austrian or Prussian dominance. Minorities are the 
weakest predictor in the culture/religion cluster and fail to achieve significance on the NiT 
measure. However, it operates in the expected direction, which gives some indications that 
corruption could be more likely to occur in a country that struggles with ethnic fractionalization.  
Table 9: Bivariate pairwise correlations between legacies and corruption scores   
Note: Bolded coefficients are significant at .05 (two-tailed) 
Among the economic legacies natural resource endowments is the strongest predictor followed 
by energy intensity. The correlation of the former variable is theoretically expected and could 
confirm the notion of a “resource curse” when it comes to corruption. Energy intensity also has 
some significance, which could indicate that the uncompetitive and energy-intensive plan 
economies indeed had harmful effects that facilitated corrupt practices that prevail to this day. 
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TI 99 .35 -.58 .52 -.52 .52 .47 .18 -.59 -.35 -.36 .76 -.56 -.53 .56 
TI 03 .34 -.48 .56 -.45 .41 .46 .08 -.70 -.46 -.50 .81 -.56 -.55 .58 
TI 07 .39 -.41 .56 -.56 .48 .46 .33 -.69 -.41 -.30 .85 -.61 -.71 .72 
TI 11 .35 -.41 .46 -.46 .59 .33 .34 -.58 -.39 -.35 .78 -.61 -.57 .71 
WB 98 .36 -.38 .51 -.61 .40 .43 .26 -.67 -.32 -.25 .81 -.52 -.58 .64 
WB 03 .34 -.36 .63 -.60 .41 .43 .33 -.67 -.46 -.30 .87 -.67 -.67 .71 
WB 07 .35 -.39 .57 -.56 .52 .44 .37 -.66 -.40 -.31 .86 -.60 -.66 .74 
WB 11 .36 -.39 .55 -.52 .55 .46 .37 -.65 -.41 -.31 .82 -.61 -.62 .78 
NiT 99 .37 -.43 .57 -.60 .51 .34 .31 -.65 -.37 -.24 .83 -.63 -.56 .64 
NiT 03 .37 -.51 .55 -.60 .47 .40 .34 -.62 -.38 -.24 .86 -.73 -.63 .73 
NiT 07 .26 -.51 .54 -.50 .49 .42 .41 -.59 -.39 -.16 .82 -.75 -.63 .78 
NiT 11 .24 -.51 .54 -.50 .54 .49 .39 -.60 -.40 -.24 .82 -.73 -.64 .81 
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The last variable, trade dependence, is non-significant which could mean that less dependence on 
intra-communist trade (and thus potentially more interaction with the west in terms of trade) has 
probably not affected corruption levels in any substantial way.  
GDP per capita 1980 is by far the most powerful predictor among the modernization legacies. 
Higher economic development at the outset of the transition has indeed helped these countries 
achieve lower levels of corruption. Urbanization 1989 is statistically significant most of the times 
but the correlations are not so strong making it a medium-to-weak indicator. Higher education is 
almost completely insignificant.  
The last legacy cluster – institutions – displays several strong predictors of corruption. 
Bureaucratic legacy is the most powerful and points to the same conclusion as that of Møller and 
Skaaning (2010): national bureaucracies that historically have lacked  ‘Weberian’ ideals of 
rationality and impartiality are associated with higher levels of corruption. A history of statehood 
and prior democracy also appears as consistently strong correlates of corruption, and both in the 
expected negative direction. Pre-war Soviet republic, a somewhat blunt measure of communist 
legacy, is almost as powerful a predictor as bureaucratic legacy and points to the seemingly 
“corruption-enhancive” nature of communism (Karklins 2002).   
Moreover, the data shows some interesting over-time change in correlations between legacies and 
corruption; the strength of the relationship between corruption and several historical legacies 
actually increases over time. This is particularly clear in the legacy-clusters of institutions, and is 
observed in all three measures. Among all the indicators, only imperial legacy appears to have a 
clear diminishing trend.  
Cross-Sectional Data and the Legacy-Corruption Link 
Despite the strong correlations between different legacy-clusters and corruption they cannot tell 
us anything about causality. This is even more so when one considers the fact that several 
historical legacies are highly correlated with each other. In order to reveal causal links regression 
analysis is required.  
Several scholars have used cross-sectional regressions when analyzing post-communist 
corruption (Møller and Skaaning 2010, Treisman 2007) The following section presents multiple 
cross-sectional regression results, and I will use these to discuss what cross-sectional regression  
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Table 10: Legacies and corruption: cross-sectional regression results 
 
(1) 
TI  
1999 
(2) 
WB  
1998 
(3) 
NiT  
1999 
(4) 
TI  
2005 
(5) 
WB  
2005 
(6) 
NiT  
2005 
(7) 
TI  
2010 
(8) 
WB  
2010 
(9) 
NiT  
2010 
Protestant 1980 -0.25** 
(.010) 
-0.13 
(.013) 
-.013 
(.021) 
-.036*** 
(.009) 
-0.21** 
(.008) 
-.023 
(.016) 
-.023* 
(.012) 
-.015 
(.011) 
-.018 
(.017) 
Bureaucratic 
Legacy  
.808*** 
(.155) 
1.031*** 
(.207) 
1.564*** 
(.329) 
.736*** 
(.165) 
.923*** 
(.134) 
1.426*** 
(.256) 
.761*** 
(.186) 
.759*** 
(.171) 
1.210*** 
(.265) 
Resource 
Endowments  
.151 
(.187) 
.215 
(.248) 
.070 
(.395) 
.201 
(.165) 
.156 
(.161) 
.297 
(.307) 
.106 
(.223) 
.313 
(.205) 
.637* 
(.317) 
Statehood  -.084 
(.175) 
-.088 
(.237) 
-.629 
(.377) 
-.122 
(.157) 
-.311* 
(.154) 
-.923*** 
(.293) 
-.403* 
(.213) 
-.432** 
(.196) 
-1.064*** 
(.303) 
Constant 4.602*** 
(.526) 
2.816*** 
(.720) 
2.382** 
(1.143) 
4.731*** 
(.478) 
3.224*** 
(.467) 
2.995*** 
(.890) 
4.648*** 
(.647) 
3.807*** 
(.595) 
3.617*** 
(.919) 
N 23 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 
R
2 
.77 .69 .70 .82 .86 .83 .72 .76 .82 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.10
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can and cannot tell us about the relationship between historical legacies and post-communist 
corruption.  
Table 7 above illustrates the effect of legacies on the three different corruption measures in 
1998/1999, 2005 and 2010. By using multiple cross-sectional OLS regressions at different points 
in time may aim is to capture corruption patterns at the start, the midpoint and at the most recent 
time in the available data. The model does not claim to include all the potentially relevant 
variables (which is out of the question anyways because of sample size limitations), since the aim 
of these cross-sectional regressions are simply to illustrate the effect of legacies.  
The four explanatory variables included in the model are all “initial conditions” that were present 
at the beginning of the transition. They are Protestant heritage, Bureaucratic legacy, Resource 
endowments and Statehood, which represent three of the five legacy clusters introduced earlier.
28
  
The first noticeable finding is the strong joint explanatory power of the four legacy indicators. In 
eight of the nine models 70% or more of the cross-country variation is captured. Furthermore, the 
WB and NiT measures suggest that historical legacies were stronger predictors of post-
communist corruption levels in 2010 than they were in the late 90’s. Models 8 and 9 have 
adjusted R-squared statistics of .76 and .82 compared to .69 and .70 in 1990. That being said, the 
models that has the most explanatory power are the once that explain corruption levels in 2005, 
and this is true for all three measures.   
The WB index is the only measure that shows diminishing explanatory power from 2005 to 2010, 
an adjusted R-squared statistic from .89 to .83. However, the scores in 2010 are larger than those 
in 1998 (.73 compared to .83), thus giving partial support for argument that the effect of 
historical legacies seems to grow. In addition, the two other measures consistently increase over 
time.  Interestingly, all of these results are obtained by only including what Kitschelt (2003) calls 
remote and “deep” variables, making it even more plausible to argue that post-communist 
corruption cannot be explained by causes that are too “shallow” and temporally too close to the 
phenomenon being studied.   
When it comes to estimating the effect of individual variables the results in Table 7.1 are less 
conclusive. Bureaucratic legacy is the only variable that is consistently statistically significant    
                                                 
28
 The legacy cluster of modernization is excluded because of lack of significance and/or high multicollinearity. 
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over the different models. For the other variables it is difficult to claim robust links, which makes 
it impossible to establish any credible sense of causality between individual legacies and 
corruption levels. What is striking, however, is the consistent and statistically significant effect of 
bureaucratic legacy on all measures. A history of statehood has a quite significant negative effect 
on corruption levels after the turn of the millennia, while the percentage of Protestants has a 
marginal and sometimes significant effect.  
The lack of consistent significance on all the other variables except bureaucratic legacy could be 
because they are weak predictors of post-communist corruption. However, it is more likely that 
these observations are the result of the analytical shortcomings of cross-sectional OLS 
regressions.  
First, OLS regressions cannot deal with small sample sizes
29
 and second, it is unsuitable for 
handling over-time change.
30
 These challenges can be addressed, at least in part, by using times-
series cross-section (TSCS) data. In the following section, hypotheses two, three and four will be 
tested using Prais-Winsten regressions with panel-corrected standard errors. It is applied on the 
longest available time-span for each of the three corruption measures.  
5.1.3 Testing Hypothesis Two, Three and Four: Protestantism, Bureaucratic Legacy and 
Imperial Legacy 
As is seen on the page below, the model specification in Table 8 is broader and includes more 
legacy-indicators than the cross-sectional model. The additional indicators are Imperial legacy, 
Minorities, Muslim and a measure of the logged duration of democratic years after the transition. 
The purpose of the latter variable is to capture the temporal effect of post-communist democracy 
on corruption levels. In addition, democracy year is used to construct interaction terms with key 
historical legacies. By these interaction terms I hope to capture how the effect of historical 
legacies interacts with post-communist democratic development, and how this in turn affects 
corruption levels. 
                                                 
29
 One standard solution to this problem is to expand the sample size. However, this is of no use for the current study 
since the post-communist countries comprise only a limited set of countries.  
30
 By extending the approach in Table 7 one could have run cross-sectional regressions over many years but 
interpreting coefficients over many models is inconvenient. In addition, such an approach would ignore serial 
correlation.   
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Testing Hypothesis 2  
H2 states that a protestant heritage should decrease post-communist corruption levels. Table 8 
below displays the results when H2 are tested on the full sample. The coefficient for protestant 
heritage is significant on the 99 percent level across all three measures. This high level of 
significance across measures is quite striking and strengthens the robustness of the finding. 
Further, Protestantism effects corruption in the hypothesized direction, but the effect is minimal. 
It varies from -.021 to -.036, which means that a 1% increase in protestant adherents in 1980 will 
result in a .021 to .036 points decrease of post-communist corruption on a 10-point scale. In other 
words, the models tell us that a protestant heritage (marginally) decreases post-communist 
corruption.  
Models 2, 7 and 12 were also run without the case of Estonia, but the results did not change.
31
 
This is reassuring since Estonia could be expected to drive the results.
32
 Models 3, 8 and 13 
include an interaction term between protestant heritage and the consecutive number of years a 
country has been democratic after the transition. According to the results, the effect of protestant 
heritage is basically the same if one controls for post-communist democratic development, even 
though it diminishes somewhat.  
Model specification and diagnostics looks fine. First, all models containing the “standard battery” 
of variables (models 2, 7 and 12) stayed within the limits of multicollinearity. They all had mean 
VIF values under 3.7 and the condition number of the models did not exceed 24. Second, several 
of the controls are statistically significant and their effect goes in the hypothesized direction. 
Even though controls are not of main theoretical interest here, it is important to understand them 
and their relative effect on the dependent variable, since they touch directly on issues of model 
specification. If the controls are not meaningful we cannot be confident in findings.  
 
 
                                                 
31
 The effect even in some instances got stronger.  
32
 When it comes to protestant adherents in 1980 Estonia is an outlier. Approximately 60 % of Estonians were 
Protestants in 1980, while the number varied from 0 to 20 % in the other countries.   
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Table 11: Testing hypotheses two, three and four: PW-regression results 
 (1) 
TI 
(2) 
TI 
(3) 
TI 
(4) 
TI 
(5) 
TI 
(6) 
WB 
(7) 
WB 
(8) 
WB 
(9) 
WB 
(10) 
WB 
(11) 
WB 
(12) 
NiT 
(13) 
NiT 
(14) 
NiT 
(15) 
NiT 
(16) 
NiT 
Protestant 
heritage 
-.028*** 
(.004) 
-.031*** 
(.003) 
-.020** 
(.008) 
-.031** 
(.003) 
-.030*** 
(.003) 
-.021*** 
(.001) 
-.024*** 
(.001) 
-.011** 
(.004) 
-.024*** 
(.001) 
-.023*** 
(.001) 
-.029*** 
(.001) 
-.031*** 
(.007) 
-.036*** 
(.007) 
-.029*** 
(.010) 
-.036*** 
(.007) 
-.035** 
(.007) 
Bureaucratic 
legacy  
.657*** 
(.111) 
.724*** 
(.096) 
.715*** 
(.096) 
.726*** 
(.098) 
.488*** 
(.161) 
.562*** 
(.048) 
.578*** 
(.044) 
.571*** 
(.045) 
.575*** 
(.043) 
.399*** 
(.109) 
 .752** 
(.293) 
.794*** 
(.289) 
.788*** 
(.288) 
.798*** 
(.291) 
.636* 
(.378) 
Statehood -.158* 
(.090) 
.060 
(.090) 
.041 
(.088) 
.062 
(.089) 
.015 
(.090) 
-.254*** 
(.059) 
-.103 
(.069) 
-.124* 
(.070) 
-.091 
(.069) 
-.137* 
(.073) 
-.318*** 
(.061) 
-.995*** 
(.156) 
-.721*** 
(.178) 
-.735*** 
(.178) 
-.689*** 
(.181) 
-.750*** 
(.187) 
Resource 
endowments 
.158** 
(.068) 
.063 
(.067) 
.078 
(.066) 
.064 
(.066) 
.118** 
(.059) 
.238*** 
(.028) 
.233*** 
(.040) 
.251*** 
(.039) 
.219*** 
(.042) 
.275*** 
(.044) 
.310*** 
(.039) 
.419*** 
(.141) 
.381*** 
(.121) 
.392*** 
(.119) 
.347*** 
(.122) 
.417*** 
(.118) 
Imperial 
legacy 
-.088 
(.148) 
.032 
(.141) 
.017 
(.140) 
.058 
(.231) 
.067 
(.138) 
-.409*** 
(.057) 
-.339*** 
(.059) 
-.352*** 
(.058) 
-.474*** 
(.127) 
-.306*** 
(.065) 
-.434*** 
(.048) 
-.730** 
(.298) 
-.593* 
(.310) 
-.603* 
(.309) 
-.898** 
(.372) 
-.570** 
(.310) 
Minorities  .008** 
(.003) 
.006* 
(.003) 
.005* 
(.003) 
.006* 
(.003) 
.008** 
(.003) 
.009*** 
(.002) 
.006** 
(.002) 
.005** 
(.002) 
.005** 
(.002) 
.008** 
(.002) 
.002 
(.002) 
.010 
(.006) 
.005 
(.005) 
.005 
(.005) 
.005 
(.005) 
.006 
(.006) 
Muslim  .152 
(.187) 
-.040 
(.135) 
-.021 
(.135) 
-.036 
(.136) 
.057 
(.137) 
.085 
(.112) 
-.000 
(.112) 
.019 
(.111) 
-.011 
(.106) 
.079 
(.124) 
.472*** 
(.079) 
.203 
(.243) 
.017 
(.242) 
.031 
(.243) 
-.017 
(.248) 
.093 
(.279) 
Democracy 
year  
 -.037*** 
(.011) 
-.033*** 
(.010) 
-.037*** 
(.008) 
-.092*** 
(.033) 
 -.025*** 
(.009) 
-.017** 
(.009) 
-.030*** 
(.010) 
-.080*** 
(.031) 
-.026*** 
(.009) 
 -.037*** 
(.012) 
-.034** 
(.013) 
-.046*** 
(.016) 
-.072 
(.045) 
Protestant 
*Demo. year 
  -.000 
(.000) 
    -.001*** 
(.000) 
     -.000 
(.000) 
  
Imp. legacy 
*Demo. year 
   -.001 
(.011) 
    .012 
(.010) 
     .021 
(.019) 
 
Bur. legacy                   
*Demo. year  
    .019** 
(.009) 
    .020* 
(.010) 
     .012 
(.016) 
Unfavorable 
bur. legacy 
          1.395*** 
(.166) 
     
Constant 4.614*** 
(.445) 
4.735*** 
(416) 
4.730*** 
(420) 
4.720*** 
(428) 
5.387*** 
(603) 
4.320*** 
(.150) 
4.443*** 
(.136) 
4.422*** 
(.139) 
4.492*** 
(.142) 
4.931*** 
(.305) 
5.135*** 
(.166) 
4.987*** 
(1.054) 
5.213*** 
(1.016) 
5.210*** 
(1.005) 
5.293*** 
(1.015) 
5.650*** 
(1.223) 
N 340 322 322 322 322 312 299 299 299 299 299 336 321 321 321 321 
R2 .87 .88 .88 .88 .88 .94 .94 .94 .94 .95 .94 .82 .85 .85 .85 .84 
rho .755 .736 .739 .744 .731 .775 .761 .774 .751 .777 .733 .883 .873 .872 .874 .877 
Note: All estimates are unstandardized regression coefficients with panel corrected standard errors in parentheses. *** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.10
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Bureaucratic legacy is significant at the 99 percent level in all but one model and effects 
corruption in the expected direction. However, since this variable will be analyzed more 
thoroughly in the next section I will not elaborate more extensively on it here. It suffices to say 
that its effect is both relatively strong and significant. 
Coefficients reflecting statehood are significant (at the 90 and 99 percent level) in the TI and WB 
measures when democracy year is not included (models 1 and 3). When democracy year is 
included, however, its effect is insignificant. The models using the NiT measure differs from the 
two other measures in this regard; models 11 and 12 display statehood as significant both with 
and without the democracy year variable. In addition, the effect of statehood is considerably 
stronger in the NiT models than in the TI and WB models.  
Models 1-4 predicts that the effect of statehood disappears once post-communist democratic 
years are controlled for, but the results in models 9-10 (NiT) contradicts this, showing a 
significant negative effect on post-communist levels of corruption even though the effect of 
democracy year is taken into account. Hence, the results suggest that a country is able to draw 
from a historical experience of statehood, which has positive effects when it comes to reducing 
corruption.   
The resource endowments coefficients are significant in all WB and NiT models (only significant 
in model 1 and 5 with the TI measure) and indicates that the theorized “resource curse” could be 
present. The effect can be characterized as medium, ranging from .158 in model 1 to .419 in 
model 11, and the results show a consistently positive effect on post-communist corruption 
levels.  
An interesting finding when it comes to the Imperial legacy coefficients is its total lack of 
significance in the TI models, while the coefficients are significant in all the WB and NiT 
models. It is not easy to say why the coefficients fail to display significant results using the TI 
measure, but the consistently medium-to-strong negative effect in the two latter measures 
indicates that imperial legacy is an important variable. However, this variable will be treated 
more thoroughly when hypothesis 4 is tested. 
67 
 
Minorities display a marginal effect on corruption, but are statically significant in many of the TI 
and WB models. The effect goes in the hypothesized direction but because the effect is so small it 
is difficult to make a meaningful interpretation of the results.  
The coefficients reflecting predominantly Muslim countries fail to achieve significance in any of 
the models. Hence, the argument used in the democracy literature about the negative effects of 
Islam cannot be confirmed when it comes to corruption. Other variables seem more important.  
A few considerations must also be made about the democracy year variable. It is significant in all 
but one model (model 15) and consistently shows a small negative effect on corruption levels. 
This indicates that democratic development after the transition has contributed to a small 
decrease in corruption levels. Interestingly, both in the TI and WB measure the significant 
negative effect of statehood is relegated to insignificance once democracy year is introduced. In 
addition, democracy year produces an increased R-statistic in both model 2 and model 12.  
Testing Hypothesis 3 
H3 states that variations in levels of post-communist corruption can be largely be explained by 
variations in pre-communist bureaucratic legacies. The coefficients reflecting bureaucratic 
legacy are significant in all models and significant at the 99 percent level in all but two models 
(11 and 15). All the models display the effect as going in the hypothesized direction – the more 
unfavorable the bureaucratic legacy of a country the more it will experience increased levels of 
post-communist corruption. The coefficients for bureaucratic legacy clearly display the strongest 
results of all the legacy indicators. It is robust across all measures, it is consistently significant 
and it displays the strongest effect (between .58 and .79 in the base models).  
When the interaction term between bureaucratic legacy and democracy years is included (models 
5, 10 and 15), the coefficients for bureaucratic legacy drop somewhat, but are still significant. 
The interaction term display significant results at the 10% level in the TI and WB models and 
shows an effect of around .020. This is, of course, a small effect, but the interesting fact about 
this coefficient is its positive direction. Hence, the data could suggest that an unfavorable 
bureaucratic legacy still has a small but significant positive effect on post-communist corruption 
levels even when a country develops democratically. Put differently, the effect of the legacy 
seems to marginally increase over time even when those years are “democratic.” However, 
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because the coefficients are so small and not significant in the NiT model (model 16), this finding 
must be interpreted with absolute caution. Another observation is that the interaction term 
increased the r-statistic from .94 to .95 in the WB model. This is of course minimal, but could 
point in the direction of increased explanatory power.   
Lastly, to further verify the findings, a dummy-variable for unfavorable bureaucratic legacy is 
introduced in model 11. This indicator is constructed by placing value 2, 3 and 4 of the 
bureaucratic legacy indicator (national-accommodative legacy, patrimonial legacy and colonial 
peripheral legacy) into the category of “unfavorable” bureaucratic legacy, thus implicitly treating 
value 1 and 2 (bureaucratic-authoritarian and national accommodative) as a “favorable” legacy.  
To split bureaucratic legacy between value 1 and 2 on the one side, and value 3 and 4 on the 
other side made most sense theoretically: it is only a bureaucratic-authoritarian/national 
accommodative legacy that favors democracy and thus could be expected to have a diminishing 
effect on corruption (Moller 2009:97). Coefficients for the unfavorable bureaucratic legacy 
variable indicate that not having a bureaucratic-authoritarian legacy will increase post-communist 
corruption by around 1.3 on the 10-point scale.
33
 In other words, the costs of not having the 
“right” bureaucratic legacy are severe when it comes to post-communist levels of corruption. 
In addition, an interesting observation is that the coefficients representing Muslim becomes 
significant for the first time when the dummy is introduced. It is hard to say exactly what this 
means, but the Muslim coefficient probably captures the fact that almost all Muslim countries are 
coded with the “most” unfavorable legacy (colonial peripheral). 
Testing Hypothesis 4 
H4 states that a Western imperial legacy should decrease post-communist corruption levels. As 
mentioned earlier, imperial legacy is significant in all the WB and NiT models but fails to reach 
significance in any of the TI models. Such a clear pattern in the results is interesting since it 
indicates that the TI measure, in some regard, differentiates from the two other measures. It is 
unclear why it fails to capture any significant effect of imperial legacy, but it could mean that the 
TI index measures a slightly different phenomenon than the two other indexes. Even though the 
imperial legacy coefficients fails to achieve the same kind of robustness as protestant heritage 
                                                 
33
 The results were similar when tested against the TI and NiT measure.   
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and bureaucratic legacy (significant across all three measures), the significant results from model 
6 to 16 makes it a credible finding.  
In addition, all the coefficients point in the hypothesized direction. On average, a favorable 
imperial legacy seems to reduce post-communist corruption by around .45 points on the 10-point 
scale. That is the second strongest effect displayed in the models, slightly behind bureaucratic 
legacy. The interaction term between imperial legacy and democracy years (models 4, 9 and 15) 
fails to capture any significant effect.   
As laid out in chapter four, the imperial legacy indicator is made up of three values: (2) Western, 
(1) mixed and (0) Ottoman/Russian. An alternative approach would be to categorize the variable 
as a dummy between Western and non-western. However, by also including the mixed category I 
hope to capture a more nuanced picture of the effect of imperial legacy. When a dummy for 
mixed imperial legacy was ran against the base model it showed a significant increase (around 
.40 significant at the 99 percent level) in corruption levels.
34
 In other words, only a more or less 
clear western imperial legacy seems to reduce post-communist corruption.   
Before testing alternative explanations it is important to address some methodological challenges 
that could delude our interpretations of the results. In the following, we will look at the 
intertwined nature of legacies and how this affects our ability to interpret individual legacy-
effects.  
5.1.4 Methodological Challenges and Potential Solutions 
Intertwined Legacies 
The fact that correlations are strong between legacy-indicators within the same legacy cluster (i.e. 
between Bureaucratic legacy and Prewar Soviet Republic that was correlated at .71) is a good 
sign; it strengthens the reliability of measure. However, there are also strong correlations between 
indicators of different legacy types (such as Imperial legacy and Bureaucratic legacy which is 
correlated at -.70)
35
 and this creates substantial difficulties for interpreting the role of individual 
legacies.
36
    
                                                 
34
 This was not included in Table 8.  
35
 However, none of these highly correlated variables exceeded the critical VIF value of 10.   
36
 For an overview of all correlations see Appendix B.  
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One significant problem with strong correlations between different legacy indicators is that it can 
lead to high multicollinearity. While it is only perfect multicollinearity that violates regression 
assumptions (Berry 1993:27), high multicollinearity makes it difficult to interpret the size of the 
individual coefficients and it often produces inflated standard errors accompanied by a too 
optimistic R
2
 statistic. This weakens the feasibility of the regression analysis when trying to 
assess the explanatory power of competing legacy-explanations. Therefore, in such an 
environment, regression analysis could be somewhat ill equipped for identifying individual 
effects, even though it can tell us that variables matter jointly. That being said, Wooldridge 
(2009:97) claims that the problem with high multicollinearity probably have been exaggerated. 
After all, the aim of multiple regression analysis is to study effects after the correlations between 
the explanatory variables has been controlled for (Midtbø 2012:129).  
In the current study, a statistical model consisting of all the legacy variables introduced in the 
first section of this chapter would be plagued by rather severe multicollinearity problems.
37
 The 
basic models in table 8 (models 2, 7 and 13), however, all had acceptable levels of 
multicollinearity
38
, but this was achieved at the cost of excluding several potentially relevant 
explanatory variables. Especially, this was done so that bureaucratic legacy, a theoretically 
strong variable, could be included in the models.
39
 Hence, the models could be incorrectly 
specified, risking biased estimates.  
Alternative methods 
There are of course other methods available instead of regression analysis. Some scholars have 
used factor analysis in an attempt to cut through the complexity if intertwined legacies. In the 
post-communist literature De Melo et al. (2001) used factor analysis to reduce several initial 
conditions into two measures, which they interpreted at “macroeconomic distortions” and “over-
industrialization.” While such an approach is useful when considering the limited degrees of 
freedom in cross-sectional regressions, it has some analytical shortcomings because of the 
                                                 
37
 Therefore several indicators had to be excluded. Amongst them was Prewar Soviet Republic, GDP/cap 1989, 
Energy intensity, and they all had variance inflation factors (VIF) above the critical value of 10. In addition, the 
condition number of the model was at times extremely high.  
38
 All of the independent variables had VIF values below 7 and the condition number was around 31.  
39
 Had not bureaucratic legacy been included several other variables would have been part of the analysis. However, 
it was a trade-off, and bureaucratic legacy was seen as too important to exclude.    
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potential difficulty of interpreting the meaning of the results, which in turn restrain a substantive 
understanding of legacies.  
An alternative approach would be to focus on case studies and leave regression analysis behind 
altogether. The positive effect of this approach would be the ability to trace the causal 
mechanisms at play in much more detail but, nevertheless, one would probably still have to face 
the challenges of intertwined legacies.  
One assumption of structured case comparisons is that the cases differ on one indicator while all 
others are being equal. This is seldom or never the case when it comes to historical legacies. 
Among the post-communist countries for instance, even the countries that are the most “similar” 
(say the Baltic countries) differ on several indicators (i.e. religion). That being said, case studies 
are an indispensable supplement to statistical methods, and when such cases are selected by a 
most-similar cases design, they will produce important in-depth knowledge about the complex 
effects of intertwined historical legacies. Furthermore, such case-study results could provide the 
basis for Bayesian statistical methods as a viable alternative to regression analysis, especially 
when dealing with small sample sizes and strongly correlated explanatory variables (see Western 
and Jackman 1994).  
Lastly, another alternative approach, when trying to analyze complex historical legacies, is to 
look at subnational variation. This has successfully been done by Møller and Skaaning (2010) 
when they used subnational corruption scores to assess the impact of bureaucratic legacies in 
“cleft countries” (countries historically divided between different empires). However, such an 
approach suffers somewhat by the potential small variation in subnational corruption scores, and 
the limited existence of broad subnational corruption indicators.      
5.1.5 Alternative Explanations 
Having confirmed the strong and enduring effect of historical legacies on post-communist levels 
of corruption, it is time to test the robustness of these findings when compared to proximate 
explanations of post-communist corruption. I find that historical legacies remain powerful 
predictors of post-communist levels of corruption even when controlling for several prominent 
alternative explanations such as democracy, GDP, initial power balance, presidential powers, EU 
conditionality and geographic diffusion. 
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Democracy is the first alternative explanation that is tested in table 10 (model 1). To measure 
democracy I use the index developed by Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland (2010),
40
 where 
countries are coded as either democracy or dictatorship for every year between 1946 and 2008. 
As laid out in the theory chapter, corruption is directly opposed to democratic ideals of equality 
and openness (since corruption requires special access and hidden influence), and therefore it is 
expected that democracy should lead to lower levels of corruption (Della Porta and Pizzorno 
1996:74).  
The second proximate explanation focuses on the initial power balance between the “old” 
communists and the “new” democratic challengers. McFaul (2002) has developed a typology of 
post-communist regimes based on whether their balance of power were in favor of the old 
regime, whether it were even or uncertain or whether it was in favor of the challengers. The 
argument is that the power balance between democrats and authoritarians at the outset of the 
transition decides the future prospects for democracy, since the political winners impose their 
will on the losers.
41
  
The third explanation focuses on the potential negative consequences of a powerful president 
when it comes to corruption. To measure presidential powers I apply the index developed by Frye 
(1997) for presidential powers in post-communist presidencies.
42
 Several scholars have argued 
that presidentialism can cause higher levels of corruption. Panizza (2001) have found that 
countries with presidentialism have significantly higher levels of perceived corruption than other 
countries.
43
 Most of the post-communist countries chose a kind of semi-presidentialism at the 
outset of the transition, with a prime minister and a powerful president.  
EU conditionality is another proximate explanation. According to Kurtz and Barnes (2002) 
prospects of EU accession are an important predictor of post-communist regime change, even 
when other potentially strong legacies are controlled for. The potential EU member indicator is 
based on their work, and they argue that the governments that had a reasonable hope of joining 
                                                 
40
 A regime is considered a democracy if the executive and the legislature is directly or indirectly elected by popular 
vote, multiple parties are allowed, there is de facto existence of multiple parties not controlled by the regime, there 
are multiple parties within the legislature, and there has been no consolidation of incumbent’s advantage (i.e. 
unconstitutional closing of the lower house).  
41
 Even though this argument is aimed at democratization it is reasonable to suspect similar consequences when it 
comes to corruption 
42
 The cross-country scorings are provided for in Appendix B  
43
 This finding is also confirmed by Kunicová and Rose-Ackerman (2005).  
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the EU after the transition were Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia. Only these countries began negotiations with 
the EU before or immediately after the breakdown of the Communist Party regimes (Kurtz and 
Barnes 2002:529).
44
  
Other studies have also found that prospects of EU accession has forced countries to reform both 
the state and the economy, and improving transparency in institutions (Vachudova 2009).
45
 In 
this regard, it is natural to think that the possibility of EU accession has acted as an incentive to 
reduce corruption in these particular post-communist countries.  
Finally, the international openness index constructed by Kopstein and Reilly (2000) represent a 
proximate explanation based on the argument of geographic diffusion.
46
 The authors use distance 
from the West and the lagged degree of democracy in neighboring countries as a proxy for 
geographic diffusion.
47
 Basically, their argument is that post-communist regimes were not only 
affected by domestic factors but also by international influences.  
Despite the fact that the alternative explanations discussed above are theoretically plausible and 
are strongly correlated with the different corruption indicators, they do not perform very well 
when pitted against the temporally and theoretically prior historical legacies. This can be seen in 
Table 10 below, where the different alternative theories are tested against the “standard battery” 
of legacy indicators used in the earlier sections. As a last observation before turning to the 
individual effect of the different explanations, it is worth noticing that most legacy indicators are 
remarkably stable despite the fact that other variables are introduced.
                                                 
44
 Many would argue that Croatia also belongs in this group, but that its accession was delayed by the civil war. 
However, the results were the same when Croatia was included.  
45
 In addition, scholars claim that it is the prospect of joining the EU and not the accession per se that produces 
viable reforms. Apparently, some countries lost their zeal for reforms once they became member states.  
46
 I want to thank the authors for generously providing me with the data.  
47
 The complete index can be found in Appendix A 
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Table 12: Legacies and alternative explanations: PW-regression results 
 (1) 
TI 
(2) 
TI 
(3) 
TI 
(4) 
TI 
(5) 
TI 
(6) 
TI 
(7) 
WB 
(8) 
WB 
(9) 
WB 
(10) 
WB 
(11) 
WB 
(12) 
NiT 
(13) 
NiT 
(14) 
NiT 
(15) 
NiT 
(16) 
NiT 
Protestant  
heritage  
-.032*** 
(.004) 
-.031*** 
(.003) 
-.030*** 
(.003) 
-.032*** 
(.003) 
-.030*** 
(.003) 
-.030*** 
(.004) 
-.024*** 
(.001) 
-.024*** 
(.001) 
-.024*** 
(.002) 
-.023*** 
(.001) 
-.021*** 
(.002) 
-.037*** 
(.006) 
-.030*** 
(.008) 
-.030*** 
(.009) 
-.031*** 
(.007) 
-.043*** 
(.008) 
Bureaucratic  
legacy  
.710*** 
(.111) 
.448*** 
(.080) 
.720*** 
(.091) 
.744*** 
(.120) 
.652*** 
(.105) 
.718*** 
(.094) 
.483*** 
(.066) 
.575*** 
(.044) 
.561*** 
(.061) 
.427*** 
(.063) 
.562*** 
(.041) 
.775*** 
(.289) 
.774*** 
(.290) 
.529** 
(.314) 
.308 
(.274) 
.827*** 
(.291) 
Statehood  -.006 
(.093) 
.091 
(.090) 
.051 
(.089) 
.066 
(.093) 
.114 
(.089) 
.082 
(.093) 
-.053 
(.073) 
-.095* 
(.056) 
-.140 
(.088) 
.033 
(.078) 
.037 
(.075) 
-.723*** 
(.182) 
-.730*** 
(.180) 
-.761*** 
(.187) 
-.274 
(.209) 
-.849*** 
(.128) 
Resource  
endowments  
.152* 
(.082) 
.298*** 
(.087) 
.056 
(.067) 
.056 
(.081) 
.053 
(.066) 
.056 
(.068) 
.298*** 
(.051) 
.225*** 
(.040) 
.277*** 
(.064) 
.201*** 
(.040) 
.214*** 
(.038) 
.395*** 
(.148) 
.308*** 
(.118) 
.441*** 
(.143) 
.281** 
(.133) 
.417*** 
(.120) 
Imperial  
legacy  
-.056 
(.155) 
.014*** 
(.136) 
.050 
(.118) 
.037 
(.139) 
.025 
(.137) 
.069 
(.152) 
-.311*** 
(.067) 
-.331*** 
(.058) 
-.377*** 
(.059) 
-.344*** 
(.059) 
-.234*** 
(.072) 
-.608** 
(.292) 
-.479 
(.323) 
-.644** 
(.327) 
-.614** 
(.287) 
-.800** 
(.321) 
Minorities  .007 
(.004) 
.005 
(.003) 
.005 
(.003) 
.007 
(.005) 
.006 
(.003) 
.006* 
(.003) 
.005** 
(.002) 
.005** 
(.002) 
.005 
(.003) 
.005** 
(.002) 
.006*** 
(.002) 
.006 
(.005) 
.002 
(.006) 
.002 
(.008) 
.003 
(.005) 
.004 
(.005) 
Muslim  -012 
(.135) 
-.073 
(.125) 
-.078 
(.132) 
-.084 
(.179) 
-.008 
(.131) 
-.037 
(.133) 
-.011 
(.108) 
-.016 
(.080) 
.020 
(.175) 
.082 
(.116) 
.004 
(.108) 
.014 
(.230) 
-.171 
(.241) 
.376 
(.369) 
.275 
(.238) 
.005 
(.245) 
Democracy  
year 
-.042*** 
(.012) 
-.012 
(.011) 
-.035*** 
(.010) 
-.038*** 
(.011) 
-.035*** 
(.010) 
-.037*** 
(.011) 
-.020** 
(.008) 
-.024*** 
(.008) 
-.024** 
(.009) 
-.022** 
(.009) 
-.024*** 
(.015) 
-.032*** 
(.013) 
-.035*** 
(.012) 
-.034*** 
(.012) 
-.030** 
(.012) 
-.038*** 
(.012) 
Democracy 
(1-year lag) 
.312 
(.203) 
               
Log GDP /cap 
(1-year lag) 
 -.482*** 
(.115) 
    -.185* 
(.108) 
    -.027 
(.153) 
    
Initial power  
balance 
  -.078 
(.111) 
    -.060 
(.084) 
    -.435*** 
(.116) 
   
Presidential  
powers 
   -.005 
(.020) 
    -.008 
(.021) 
    .040 
(.034) 
  
Potential EU  
candidate  
    -.256*** 
(.148) 
    -.564*** 
(.131) 
    -1.829*** 
(.487) 
 
Openness      -.017 
(.018) 
    -.046*** 
(.015) 
    -.093*** 
(.025) 
Constant 4.660*** 
(.514) 
9.530*** 
(.932) 
4.850*** 
(.497) 
4.728*** 
(.270) 
4.989*** 
(.443) 
4.944*** 
(.444) 
6.211*** 
(1.061) 
4.553*** 
(.224) 
4.642*** 
(.270) 
4.975*** 
(.194) 
5.013*** 
(.144) 
5.447*** 
(1.766) 
5.858*** 
(1.034) 
5.309*** 
(1.070) 
6.930*** 
(.989) 
4.065*** 
(1.094) 
N 254 300 322 308 322 322 299 299 286 299 299 299 321 307 321 321 
R2 .90 .90 .88 .88 .88 .88 .94 .94 .94 .94 .94 .86 .85 .84 .86 .85 
rho .726 .710 .720 .737 .721 .732 .761 .718 .764 .749 .765 .859 .874 .871 .860 .874 
Note: All estimates are unstandardized regression coefficients with panel corrected standard errors in parentheses. *** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.10
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Looking at the individual explanations, the democracy coefficients are not significant.
48
  
However, this does not have to mean that democracy is irrelevant. What it could mean is that the 
theoretical expectation about the longevity of democracy (and not current levels of democracy) 
being the decisive factor, are at play.  
Coefficients representing initial power balance fare somewhat better. Even though the results in 
model 2 (TI) and 7 (WB) are insignificant, the results in model 12 (NiT) are significant at the 99 
percent level and display a relatively strong effect (-.435). The effect points in the expected 
direction, indicating that a power balance dominated by the “challengers” could cause corruption 
levels to diminish. In addition, imperial legacy loses significance once initial power balance is 
introduced. Thus, we cannot write off the possible effect of initial power balance when it comes 
to post-communist corruption.   
Despite theoretical expectations, none of the presidential powers coefficients are significant. 
Even though some post-communist countries had unusually strong presidents (i.e. Russia, and the 
central Asian countries) historical factors seem to be more important when explaining post-
communist corruption.   
The potential EU candidate indicator displays the strongest explanatory power of all the 
alternative explanations. Here, coefficients are significant at the 99 percent level across all the 
three measures, and the effect ranges from -.256 in model 4 to -1.829 in model 15. It is hard to 
say why the NiT model display such a strong affect compared to the two other models, but it 
could seem like it takes on the explanatory power previously attributed to bureaucratic legacy. 
When the potential EU candidate predictor is introduced, coefficients representing bureaucratic 
legacy are for the first time displayed as insignificant.
49
 
Nevertheless, what models 4, 9 and 15 suggest is that a prospect for joining the EU has 
contributed to diminishing levels of post-communist corruption.  That being said, these results 
could be biased by measurement problems. As mentioned earlier, the potential EU candidate 
measure is a dummy and thus a quite blunt measure. It fails to capture any substantial differences 
                                                 
48
 The results were similar when using the WB and NiT measure. Therefore, only the TI model is displayed in table 
12.  
49
 This is probably not due to multicollinearity. The variable(s) stayed below the critical value of 10.  
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when assessing each country’s individual prospects for joining the union. However, the fact that 
the results were similar even when Croatia was included makes the finding more robust.  
Lastly, coefficients representing international openness are significant (at the 99 percent level) in 
the WB and NiT models (10 and 16). The effect is relatively small (-.046 and -.093) but, 
nevertheless, it indicates that post-communist countries with more democratic neighbors display 
somewhat lower levels of corruption.  
5.2 Summary of Findings 
We have now tested the hypotheses in various models with different corruption data. H1, which 
expected that post-communist countries were more corrupt than other countries, received support. 
This finding was robust even when controlling for the former Soviet republics, which could be 
expected to drive up the corruption levels. H2, which predicted that a protestant heritage causes 
lower levels of corruption, only received partial support. On the one hand the results were 
consistently significant across the three measures, and this was so even when Estonia was 
excluded. However, on the other hand the effect was quite small, which means that the support 
for the hypothesis cannot be more than partial. The hypothesis with the most support was H3, 
which expected that pre-communist bureaucratic legacies could explain the variation in levels of 
post-communist corruption. This variable showed the strongest effect and was remarkably stable 
across different measures and model specifications. H4, which expected lower levels of 
corruption, also received partial support. While it showed both significant and strong effects 
when using WB and NiT data, it was relegated to insignificance in all models using the TI data. 
Now as the empirical analysis is finished we can finally move on to interpret these results and see 
what conclusions can be drawn.  
 
 
 
 
 
77 
 
6. Conclusions and Implications 
This final chapter is divided up into three sections. First, it will be discussed how these results 
should be interpreted in relation to previous research and what they might contribute to the 
literature on post-communist corruption. Then, the internal and external validity of the findings 
are assessed. Finally, some suggestions for further research are presented.  
6.1 Results in Light of Previous Research  
Can levels of post-communist corruption be explained by historical legacies? This thesis has tried 
to provide some answers. First, findings of H1 seem to support the “uniqueness hypothesis”: 
post-communist countries seems to be more corrupt than other countries. This is more or less in 
line with conclusions reached by scholars such as Karklins (2005), Sandholtz and Taagepera 
(2005) and Holmes (2006). Interpreting this finding in light of the abovementioned scholar’s 
framework indicates that structural and cultural aspects of communism, and the chaos marking 
the transition from communism, are to blame for the current problems of corruption.  
However, the findings of H1 could be interpreted in the framework provided by Kitschelt. As 
highlighted several times in this thesis, Kitschelt argue that the pre-communist bureaucratic 
legacies actually got reproduced during communism. In other words, pre-communist factors 
could be causing the variation in communist-factors. Of course, a scholar like Ekiert (2003) 
would probably argue that the variation originated in the communist past , but in the words of 
Møller and Skaaning, “such a postulate simply begs the question of which ‘deeper’ factors the 
geographically fixed variation [..] should be traced back to” (2010:399). Thus, one could argue 
that the legacies explored in H3 and H4 are the actual causes of the variation in communist and 
post-communist levels of corruption. With this line of argument “communist” variables could 
actually be viewed as spurious, because the variation is caused by temporally preceding factors. 
If this is true, the higher levels of corruption in post-communist countries are not a “communist” 
phenomenon but rather the result of deeper structural factors.  
Second, findings support a partial strengthening of H2: a protestant heritage decreases post-
communist corruption.  The idea that Protestantism has a particular inhibiting effect on levels of 
corruption is drawn from the global corruption literature, where it has been identified as one of 
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the most significant predictors of lower levels of corruption. Thus, it is not surprising that a 
protestant heritage also is significant when testing it against post-communist countries.  
What is a bit surprising, however, is its significance even though Estonia is excluded from the 
regression. Estonia has in several years been the post-communist country displaying lowest levels 
of perceived corruption, and it is at the same time the only post-communist country with a 
protestant majority. This finding could thus indicate that a protestant heritage, measured as 
percent of protestant adherents in 1980, has long-term positive effects. Hence, it could be argued 
that a mere presence of protestant adherents, and not only a protestant majority, contributes to 
lower levels of corruption. That being said, the effect of protestant heritage is so small that it is 
hard to make any valid inference.  
Third, by using three different and updated measures on corruption data, and applying them in a 
TSCS analysis, this thesis has arrived at the same conclusion as Møller and Skaaning (2010): 
levels of post-communist corruption can to a large degree be explained by pre-bureaucratic 
legacies. That two studies using different statistical methods, different model specifications, and 
slightly different data, still arrive at the same conclusion gives us more confidence when claiming 
an empirical and real world relationship between pre-communist bureaucratic legacies and levels 
of post-communist corruption. This result is the strongest finding of the current thesis.  
The fourth hypothesis, that a Western imperial legacy should decrease levels of post-communist 
corruption, received partial support. It is not easy to say why the variable was insignificant using 
the TI measure. One possible explanation could be that that the TI index measures a slightly 
different phenomenon than the two other measures. The fact that both the imperial legacy 
variable and the variable on bureaucratic legacies displayed significant results indicates that deep 
structural variables are important when assessing levels of post-communist corruption.  
Causal mechanisms and the combined effect of historical legacies 
However, the aim of this thesis is not to identify the one variable that is able to explain post-
communist corruption. That would be a near impossible task due to the intertwined nature of 
legacies (and, in technical terms, the resulting multicollinearity). Rather, the aim has been to see 
if levels of post-communist corruption can be explained by the combined effect of historical 
legacies. Findings seem to support such an argument. The results of the legacy variables did not 
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change substantially even though several relevant proximate explanations were included. Thus, 
we can be more confident when pointing to the combined effect of historical legacies.  
However, as mentioned in the introduction to this thesis, it is not enough just to claim causality: 
such a claim must be supported by a causal mechanism that traces the effect of these historical 
legacies through time. By applying path dependent logic we can start to identify such a 
mechanism.
50
  
It is now over a decade since most of the post-communist countries broke out/were released from 
Austrian/Prussian, Russian or Ottoman rule. Still, it seems that the repercussions from imperial 
rule remain. Interpreting this with a path dependent logic means that imperial rule probably 
pushed these countries in a specific direction that persisted despite centuries of communist rule. 
Thus, variation in proximate variables such as economic development during communism, the 
vitality of civil society, degree of political opposition etc. could actually be a reflection of deeper 
factors. Or to put it slightly different, the deep historical factors could work “through” the 
proximate factors in producing certain outcomes.  
This does not mean, however, that proximate factors are not important or that they do not have 
explanatory power. The truth is probably that deep and structural factors work together in a 
complicated fashion, were the one influences the other and vice versa. This means that a purely 
deep and structural explanation probably becomes to fatalistic, while a purely proximate and 
actor-oriented approach probably fails to capture any causal depth. Still though, this thesis claims 
that of these factors the deeper structural are the essentials.  
6.2 Internal Validity 
Are inferences drawn from this study based upon a research design that enables us to say that 
levels of post-communist corruption are largely explained by historical legacies? We cannot be 
certain, but we are allowed to say that it seems to be so when approaching the research question 
in the way it was approach in this study. When using the definitions, data, measurements, 
controls and statistical models as done here, results indicates that there exist a strong empirical 
relationship between historical legacies and levels of post-communist corruption.  
                                                 
50
 Actually tracing causal mechanisms requires much more in-depth analysis than what I provide here. The purpose is 
to show that a causal mechanism potentially can be identified.  
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One possible danger to the internal validity of this analysis would be if the data were bad and/or 
the research design inappropriate. The research design of this thesis seems to be appropriate. It is 
based on recognized theoretical definitions, and the particular statistical method (Prais-Winsten) 
applied here seems as a good fit to handling TSCS corruption data. However, the mismatch 
between data and theoretical definition on corruption could be a source for weakened internal 
validity. After all, the data only measure perceived levels of corruption and not corruption per se, 
even though our aim was to measure corruption. That being said, these data are, at least for now, 
the best ones available – and the use of these data are common among scholars.    
When it comes to relevant controls I have tried to include those variables that the literature 
identifies as central factors affecting post-communist corruption. Data on these variables have 
mostly been used by other scholars, but it is likely that this thesis have failed to include all 
relevant factors. One example could be the proximate control of press freedom, which several 
scholars have shown is relevant for corruption (Linde 2009, Charron 2009). In addition, there 
probably also exist factors that are affecting the results that we still are not aware of.  
6.3 External Validity 
Can the theoretical expectations and statistical inferences from this study be extended to countries 
outside of the post-communist “region”? On the one hand it is difficult to extend the particular 
models and variables used here to other countries or regions. This has to do with the particular 
“post-communist” nature of several of the variables. On the other hand, however, the mechanism 
between historical legacies and current political outcomes can probably be extended. After all, it 
is plausible to expect that all countries and regions are affected by their past. The fact that the 
post-communist countries are so diverse (and not a region in the strict sense of the word) 
strengthens the assumption that these mechanisms can be extended. However, particular variables 
and their relative effect might be completely different in other settings. Thus, we cannot 
generalize our finding of the significant effect of bureaucratic legacies to countries outside of the 
post-communist universe. This must be empirically tested on its own terms.  
Based on the current analysis a more confident generalization is that historical legacies can 
explain current levels of corruption. But in terms of generalization we are only allowed to say this 
about the post-communist countries. Further research is thus needed in order to extend our 
findings.   
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6.4 Suggestions for Further Research  
This thesis has provided further evidence for the claim that levels of post-communist corruption 
can be explained by historical legacies. However, as mentioned earlier, this is not enough in order 
to reach certainty. For this we need further research, and I suggest three promising approaches: 
(1) replication of studies, presumably from new angles; (2) incorporating both proximate and 
structural variables in one approach, and (3) qualitatively tracing causal mechanisms.  
First, replication of earlier studies is important because it will increase our confidence in findings. 
In order to do so, the research question should be approached open-mindedly, with new data and 
new controls.  
Second, as highlighted by Møller (2009:109), a promising approach for further research is to try 
to incorporate deep and proximate explanations into a common explanatory framework. Thus, we 
could gain more understanding as to how these variables function together, and what kind of 
outcomes they produce.  
Lastly, qualitative studies are needed in order make a proper tracing of the causal mechanisms 
identified by quantitative studies. These insightful explanations would enrich our knowledge in 
the field, and probably encourage further quantitative studies like this one. However, these topics 
must be left for future researchers. I hope this will contribute to an increased understanding about 
the relationship between corruption and historical legacies.  
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Appendix A: Alternative Explanations 
 Democracy 1992-2008 
(Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland 
2010) 
Initial power 
balance 
(McFaul 2002) 
Presidential 
powers 
(Frye 1997) 
Potential EU-
candidate (Kurtz 
and Barnes 2002) 
 
Openness (mean 
value 1991-1996) 
(Kopstein and 
Reilly 2000) 
Albania Democracy Even/uncertain 5.25 0 14.6 
Armenia Democracy For challengers 13.5 0 12.3 
Azerbaijan Dictatorship Even/uncertain - 0 11 
Belarus Dictatorship For old regime 15 0 10.5 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
Dictatorship For challengers - 0 6.5 
Bulgaria Democracy Even/uncertain 10 1 14.6 
Croatia Democracy For challengers 14.5 0 17.6 
Czech Republic Democracy For challengers 4.75 1 20.3 
Estonia Democracy For challengers 4.5 1 19.3 
Georgia 
1992-2003:Dictatorship 
2004-2008:Democracy 
For challengers 16 0 11.1 
Hungary Democracy For challengers 7.25 1 20.3 
Kazakhstan Dictatorship For old regime 15.5 0 13.5 
Kyrgyz Republic 
1992-2004:Dictatorship 
2005-2008:Democracy 
For old regime 15.5 
0 
12.6 
Latvia Democracy For challengers 4.75 1 15.1 
Lithuania Democracy For challengers 12 1 13.3 
Macedonia Democracy Even/uncertain 6.5 0 13 
Moldova Democracy Even/uncertain 11.5 0 13.1 
Mongolia Democracy Even/uncertain - 0 12.3 
Montenegro 
1992-1999:Dictatorship 
2000-2005:Democracy 
2006-2008:Dictatorship 
For old regime - 0 11.6 
Poland Democracy For challengers 13 1 13 
Romania Democracy For old regime 14 1 11.8 
Russia Dictatorship Even/uncertain 15 0 12.5 
Serbia  
1992-1999:Dictatorship 
2000-2008:Democracy 
For old regime - 0 11.6 
Slovak Republic Democracy For challengers 5 1 15.8 
Slovenia Democracy For challengers 5.5 1 17 
Tajikistan Dictatorship Even/uncertain 13 0 8.6 
Turkmenistan Dictatorship For old regime 18.5 0 9.5 
Ukraine Democracy Even/uncertain 15 0 11.3 
Uzbekistan Dictatorship For old regime 17 0 9.1 
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Appendix B: Correlations between Independent Variables 
 
Protestant 
heritage 
Bureaucratic 
legacy 
Statehood 
Resource 
endowments 
Imperial 
legacy 
Minorities Muslim 
Democracy 
year 
Protestant 
heritage 
1.00 
(0.00) 
-0.40 
(0.00) 
0.31 
(0.00) 
-.023 
(0.03) 
0.07 
(0.00) 
0.14 
(0.00) 
-.023 
(0.00) 
0.20 
(0.00) 
Bureaucratic 
legacy 
-0.40 
(0.00) 
1.00 
(0.00) 
-0.46 
(0.00) 
0.39 
(0.00) 
-0.70 
(0.00) 
0.26 
(0.00) 
0.57 
(0.00) 
-0.49 
(0.00) 
Statehood 
0.31 
(0.00) 
-0.46 
(0.00) 
1.00 
(0.00) 
-0.18 
(0.00) 
0.09 
(0.00) 
-0.27 
(0.00) 
-0.33 
(0.00) 
0.51 
(0.00) 
Resource 
endowments 
-0.23 
(0.00) 
0.39 
(0.00) 
-0.18 
(0.00) 
1.00 
(0.00) 
-0.22 
(0.00) 
0.12 
(0.00) 
0.23 
(0.00) 
-0.42 
(0.00) 
Imperial 
legacy 
0.07 
(0.03) 
-0.70 
(0.00) 
0.09 
(0.00) 
-0.22 
(0.00) 
1.00 
(0.00) 
-0.46 
(0.00) 
-0.34 
(0.00) 
0.34 
(0.00) 
Minorities 
0.14 
(0.00) 
0.26 
(0.00) 
-0.27 
(0.00) 
0.12 
(0.00) 
-0.46 
(0.00) 
1.00 
(0.00) 
0.49 
(0.00) 
-0.38 
(0.00) 
Muslim 
-0.23 
(0.00) 
0.57 
(0.00) 
-0.33 
(0.00) 
0.23 
(0.00) 
-0.34 
(0.00) 
0.49 
(0.00) 
1.00 
(0.00) 
-0.46 
(0.00) 
Democracy 
year 
0.20 
(0.00) 
-0.49 
(0.00) 
0.51 
(0.00) 
-0.42 
(0.00) 
0.34 
(0.00) 
0.38 
(0.00) 
-0.46 
(0.00) 
1.00 
(0.00) 
Note: p-values in parentheses.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
